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ABSTRACT 
Financial Innovation 
by 
Jose C. Blanco, Doctor of Philosophy 
Utah State University, 1996 
Major Professor: Dr. Christopher Fawson 
Department: Economics 
l1 
This dissertation was a study of the impact of financial innovation upon 
financial institutions and some of the collateral macroeconomics effects. 
Financial innovation has impacted the distribution of household assets 
throughout the Group of Seven (G-7) countries and indirectly negatively 
influenced the usage of traditional monetary aggregates as a reliable tool to 
forecast the growth in the domestic money supply between 1960 and 1990. 
The empirical results indicate that the adoption of financial innovations 
by large U.S. commercial banks has not influenced their return on equity and 
the return of assets between 1990 and 1994. The variability of the return on 
equity and return on assets is reduced by those banks that have incorporated 
financial innovations over time. 
ill 
The policy implications of these results indicate that sufficient market 
instruments exist to assist banks to control interest rate exposure caused by 
the volatility of interest rates and uncertain funding sources. Any intervention 
by regulatory authorities could be welfare-decreasing for banks and possibly 
increase the level of interest rates or reduce the supply of credit to prospective 
borrowers. 
(128 pages) 
To my mother, Maria Teresa Blanco, who always believed in me 
and whose kindness and love I can never repay. 
lV 
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CHAPTER! 
TRODUCTION 
The general emphasis of this dissertation is to review how financial 
innovation may influence the economic behavior of firms and have collateral 
macroeconomic effects. Financial innovation is defined as any new financial 
product or service that emerges as a result of improved processing technology, 
regulatory changes, and/or significant economic events. 
Generally, innovations arising from technological developments are 
considered endogenous to the process of financial institutions seeking 
opportunities to offer more profitable banking and investment services to 
customers. In essence, one observes the production possibilities frontier of 
financial institutions being pushed outward. 
Financial innovations that develop from regulatory actions or as a result 
of significant economic events are considered exogenous. These exogenous 
factors may manifest themselves in modifying the underlying utility for both 
financial institutions and consumers. Financial innovations that are created 
exogenously generally are a response to greater levels of risk and uncertainty 
in capital markets. 
The microeconomic effects are studied by reviewing how the top U.S . 
banking institutions during the 1990s have introduced various types of 
financial innovations. The levels and types of financial innovations are 
2 
analyzed to see the relative contribution these innovations may have made to 
the return on equity and the return on assets. 
The erosion of traditional bases of profitability in financial and 
nonfinancial institutions in heretofore protected markets is a fundamental 
reality underlying the drive to innovate around existing regulations, to develop 
new financial products, and to exploit heretofore overlooked loopholes and 
unevenness in the tax treatment of different types of income flows. This has 
caused a greater tolerance for risk or asset-liability mismatches in seeking 
higher yields. The increased pass-through of risk from issuers to investors, in 
the opinion of some, has exacerbated the riskiness of the financial markets 
(Carter 1989). This has prompted a second round of financial innovation due 
to volatile interest rates, regulation, taxes, and technological advances which 
has emerged from the risk management behavior of economic agents (Van 
Horne 1985; Jordan 1995). 
In economic theory, risk cannot be generally eliminated or minimized 
but can be passed on to others. Financial innovation is considered to be viable 
if markets become more efficient and complete. For example, financial 
derivatives are innovations that allow one to buy and sell risks in new ways. 
The nature of derivative markets allows comparative advantages to evolve in 
identifying and managing risks. 1 
1 Financial derivatives arc generally re ferred lO as the aggregate o f the swaps, futures, 
and options markets. 
3 
Innovation that survives over time must reduce the deadweight 
transaction cost and expand the reach of the market. The reduction of cost 
generally entails the unbundling of various services, allowing each to be priced 
and sold on its own merit. Successful cost-reducing strategies force competing 
firms to adopt the innovation quickly , particularly when the elasticity of 
demand is high . The driving force behind a cost-minimizing or cost-reducing 
strategy is technological advancement (Dufey and Giddy 1981). Aside from the 
traditional cost pressure on bank and brokerage fees, there is also a cost 
associated with the gathering of information. Those costs that are rooted in 
uncertainty- search and information- are generally the most difficult to 
define (Baumol 1958). 
The influence of transaction costs on the demand for money has been 
instrumental in the determination of liquidity preference of economic agents. 
According to Baumol (1958) and Hicks (1967, 1989), high transaction costs 
make economic agents insensitive to changes in economic expectations and, 
hence, contribute to the stability of capitalism.2 Decreases in these costs are 
likely to be a direct cause of the increasing fluctuations in security pricesa 
The current view of financial transaction costs is that the reduction of costs 
!}This alludes to the fact that economic agents would not profit by undertaking a tra ding 
upport umty if the cost of buying and se ll ing a securi ty exceeds the increase over the ori ginal 
purchase price 
aTh c term "secur1ty '' prices is loose ly used Lo rcfCr to both equity and bond prices. 
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has allowed financial markets to become more complete and efficient. The 
reduction in trading and asset transfer costs has undoubtedly increased the 
substitutability among liquid assets of similar risk characteristics. This 
substitution effect between assets has caused the traditional monetary 
aggregates to move in ways unexplained by traditional macroeconomic 
variables such as income and interest rates (Pierce 1984). 
In the United States, the performance ofM1 and M2 became worse as 
the variability of corporate and household cash flows changed when new 
financial instruments appeared on the scene throughout the 1980s (Milbourne 
1986). Financial liberalization in the 1980s has been identified as a 
contributing factor in the poor pe1formance ofM4 in the U.K. (Spencer 1988).4 
Financial innovation acts as a money supply shock that increases price 
disturbances. 5 If there is persistence in real aggregate money supply shocks 
resulting from the changes in the real rate of interest, central banks will be 
'"!"'he performance of a monetary aggregate like M I refers to how the variable ha s moved 
in a predictable way. In other word s, if the central bank believes that M I a nd perso nal 
co ns umption are closely related , then a "good" or "strong" pe rformance would be the 
maintenance of the relationship. M I is defined as the sum of all cash and currency in the hand s 
of the public. M2 is the sum of M I plus a ll demand and short· term deposits with depository 
mstitutions. M3 is the sum of M I plus M2 plus money market funds a nd CD is greater than 
100.000. M4 1s defined as M3 plus other liquid assets m the hands of the pubUc (bond a nd stock 
fund s , ins urance policy cash values, etc.). 
5 Financial in novations like securitization and the Eurodollar market arc innovations 
created by financia l institutions. Sccurit1zat1o n is esse ntially the packagi ng of different classes 
of assets in to smgle-purpose vehicl es for sa le to institutional and private investors. This has 
pr.rmittcd nonbank financia l institution s to become very large -sca le lenders. The Eurodollar 
market has permitted non-U.S . resalent s to bcrrow US. dollars outside of the U.S . without the 
direct superv1s1on of the U.S . Federal Heserve Bank The Eurodollar marke t represe nts U.S . 
dollar deposits m non -U.S . banks outs1de the US Th ese deposits are then lent at varying 
~carmg ratJos , md1rcctly increasmg-thr US. money supply 
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able to forecast some portion of the changes in transaction requirements that 
accompany these shocks and dampen the residual variation in prices by 
accommodating these anticipated needs. Nondeposit transactions (repurchase 
agreements, credit cards, derivatives, mutual funds, etc.) represent a supply 
of financial instruments. This supply is not controlled by the central bank, 
creating another way the economy may respond endogenously to fluctuating 
transaction requirements associated with real shocks, thereby further 
mitigating the price adjustment. Nondeposit transactions also alter the 
economywide demand for currency and checkable bank deposit accounts, 
causing prices of goods to adjust. If the rate of adoption of financial 
innovations has a forecastable component, the central bank can smooth 
expected prices by passively accommodating these innovations. As with 
aggregate productivity shocks, this persistence may also enable the central 
bank to dampen the disturbances to the current period's price level through 
the impact of price expectations on real interest rates (Marquis and 
Cunningham 1990). 
The supply of financial innovations depends upon impulses from the 
real sector. The innovation of money responds to a stimulus in the real sector 
and, in turn, influences the potential path of real economic activity (Minsky 
1957; Silber 1975)_s Investors generally seek hedges against future stochastic 
&'J~h is 1dea suggests that financ1al innO\·auons arc spawned diffe re ntly, g ive n t.ha t the 
nature of the changmg market condition s may be 1mposmg new levels of ri sk on mdivid ua Is and 
firms. 
6 
shifts in the consumption and investment opportunity set. The development 
of financial innovations acts as an inducement to the investor as some of the 
financial risk is reduced by the unbundling of certain elements of project 
related risk (i.e. , currency, interest rate, etc.) , and this risk is sold off to 
interested parties (Fama 1970). 
Monetary innovations, as a subset of financial innovations, are 
sometimes seen as a way of promoting real growth by circumventing 
government regulations and restrictive monetary arrangements, which 
constrain developments. This is consistent with a modern view of financial 
evolution as a process of removing frictions and segmentation (Podolski 1986)7 
A general theory of financial innovation has been proposed by Silber 
(1975, 1983), who approached the subject from the microeconomic viewpoint 
of a financial institution. Financial institutions are assumed to maximize 
utility subject to some balance sheet constraint; they are forced to innovate to 
lessen or eliminate the financial constraints on the firms . 
Financial firms are willing to undertake the cost of innovation when an 
exogenous change in constraints takes place. Two examples of change are 
related to modifications to the underlying constraint to which the financial 
firm is subject. 
7Scgme ntation refers to how ce rtain LYI>CS of financial products a nd securities have a 
very specific audience. This creates the problem that certa in security types do not eas ily pe rmit 
most invm;to r~ to be ne fit (rom a particul ar mvcstmc nt o pportunity . 
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The first is an exogenous change in the utility of the firm , and the firm 
innovates in an effort to return to its previous level of utility. Needless to say, 
financial firms may enhance their level of utility following the innovation if 
new efficiencies are generated as a result of the innovative process. For 
example, if those in a firm believe they must capture a larger market share or 
diversify into other business areas, they would modify the underlying utility 
of the firm , which may have been strictly profit maximization . 
In the second case, innovation is a response to an increase in the cost of 
adhering to a regulation, essentially causing an increase in the sh adow price 
of the constraint. An example of this would be the creation of a new tax or 
regulation that increased the cost of the firm's product. The firm would need 
to innovate to increase the productivity of labor or capital, assuming that the 
price of factor inputs remains unchanged, to maintain the same level of sales 
and profitability. 
In summary, Silber (1975) states that optimizing firms will innovate 
when exogenous changes alter their constraints, and reoptimization will occur 
with regard to the costs of developing innovations. The shortcoming of Silber's 
analysis is the absence of any of the macroeconomic context dealing with the 
emergence of new markets, new firms, or monetary standards (Podolski 1986). 
Table 1 presents the influence of international financial markets and 
product innovations on microeconomic and macroeconomic exogenous sources 
8 
TABLE 1 
PRINCLPAL FINANCIAL INNOVATI ONS 
Types/Exogenous Causes• MicroeconomJc Macroeconomic 
Money market mutual funds .f(la) 
Cash ma nage ment/sweep acct. .f (3) .f(la) 
NOW acco unts .f( la) 
Automatic te ller machines .f (3) 
Zero co upon bonds .f (Ic) .f(Ia) 
Bonds w/put options & warrants .f ( lc) .f( I a)(2) 
Eurocurrency bond s .f(5) 
Foreign c urrency futures .f(5) 
Option s o n futures .f(4) 
I RA!Keogh accounts .rI c) 
Stnppcd bond s .f( I a)( I b)(2) 
I ntcrest rate futures .f(2) 
Floating rate notes .f(2) 
Exchanges traded options .f (6) 
E lectro nic trading .f (3) 
Discount trading .f (3)(4) 
I ntcrstatc banktn g .f (3)(4) 
New types of financia l institutions 
& organization .f(6) .f(J)(2) 
*'rho numbers in parentheses represent the specific exogenous ca uses of the financial 
1nnovation: ( I) mOation: (Ia) level of interest rates, ( I b) general price leve l, ( lc) tax e ffects; 
(2) volatility of interest rates; (3) technology; (4) legislative initiative; (5) ~lobalization o f 
financtal ma rkets; and (6) changes in the market structure of financial services firms . 
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of innovation . The contents of the table come from publications generated by 
Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith (1992), SG Warburg (1990), Bank of England 
(1991) , and Federal Reserve Bank (1995). The categorization of financial 
innovations into microeconomic (Silber 1975) and macroeconomic effects (Van 
Horne 1984; Chen, Roll, and Ross 1986) is an important distinction in 
researchin g the theoretical causes of financial innovation. 
The phenomenon of financial innovation has also been characteristic of 
nonfinancial institutions. Changes in the financial sector8 have induced 
nonfinancial firms and the largest industrial producers to become active 
participants in the financial markets due to shrinking returns generated in 
manufacturing and production for the last 20 years. Figure 1 illustrates the 
evolution of the nonfinancial (NFI/P%) and financial (FliP%) income9 with 
respect to nonfinancial corporate profits (Niggle 1986). 
The literature shows different combinations of state variables that can 
be useful in the prediction of returns on securities or gross national product 
(GNP) . Table 2 is a breakdown of some empirical research connecting the level 
of macroeconomic activity to financial markets. 
8Th is re fers to new types of financialmtormediaries, financial products and services, 
and financial assets. 
nF'inancial income is defined as th e sum of mtercst, royalties, ca pital gain s, a nd 
divul c nd s rece ived by nonfinancial corporations . No ninte rest financial inco me is fi nancial 
tnco mo less interest. 
100 ,-------------------
~ A ~~ 
60 -l-----------t l I ~ 
Legend ) 7 \ 
--Fli P% ~ 
---- NFI/P% I L /'--,, ~ +-------"~Lf~--~+---~~-----j '"---' ,'1 I ', I \ I ' ...... ---.... .....,_/-' \ ____ .J, 
20 ~ / 
,....._ ____ .... 
o+,-,.-,,._,,-,,_,,-,,_,, - ,.-, 
1%31%519~1%91m1~319~19n1-1~1E1%51%719~ 
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FIG . I.- Evolution of nonfinancial and financial income for corporations 
(percent). 
SOURCE.- Internal Revenue Service 1963- 1991; Ecorwmic Report of the 
President, 1990 (Table B-12) and 1993 (Table B-14). 
In a Lucas-type economy (Lucas 1978), a higher level of expected future 
production leads to both a higher expected market return and market 
premium. The expected market premium is also increasing in the conditional 
volatility of production growth. In most general equilibrium models of asset 
pricing with production, prices of financial assets depend on the conditional 
production volatility. 
According to Chen (1991), a perusal of the theoretical literature 
motivates the hypotheses relating market premium to certain stylized facts of 
11 
TABLE 2 
EMPffilCAL RESEARCH LINKING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE MA CRO ECONOMY 
Chen, Roll, Pama and 
State Variable/Model Chen 1991 and Ross 1986 French 1990 
Risk premium* ,/ ,/ 
Term premium** ,/ ,/ 
Short-term interest 
rates ,/ ,/ ,/ 
Lagged production 
growth ,/ 
Change in aggregate 
production ,/ 
Dividend yield ,/ 
Dividend price ratio ,/ 
Inflation ,/ 
Expected inflation ,/ 
Lagged stock price ratio ,/ 
Predicted Values: 
Change in GNP ,/ 
Return on securities ,/ ,/ 
*Represents the interest clifferential between low-grade and high-grade bonds. 
**Represents the interest rate differential between the short-term and 
long-term government bonds. 
the macroeconomy within the context of a Lucas-type economy (Lucas 1978): 
1. The risk aversion implicit in the pricing of financial securities and, 
hence, the expected market premium are negatively correlated with a 
measure of the relative health of the economy, such as the recent growth 
of the aggregate economy. 
12 
2. Since financial securities are claims against future outputs, a measure 
of the future productivity of capital, such as the expected growth rate of 
the aggregate economy, should be positively correlated with the 
expected market return and premium. 
3. The expected market premium is positively related to a measure of the 
conditional uncertainty of the production technology. 
In an intertemporal market equilibrium, the state variables that are 
priced are those that can forecast changes in the investment and consumption 
opportunity set. In Chen (1991), the state variables that were positively 
(negatively) related to the recent growth of the economy are negatively 
(positively) related to the expected excess market return, and state variables 
that are positively (negatively) related to the future growth rates of the 
economy are positively (negatively) related to the expected excess market 
return. 
This allows one to interpret the ability of state variables to forecast 
market returns in terms of their correlations with changes in the macro-
economic environment. 
One of the macroeconomic variables that is common to all the models 
discussed is the short-term interest rate. The short-term interest rate is the 
common metric that establishes the cost of funds for both financial and 
nonfinancial institutions for either borrowing or extending credit terms to 
13 
customers. The short-term rates of interests in the economy (Fed Funds, 
REPOs, T-Bills, etc.) are, in good part, subject to the Federal Reserve Bank's 
position on interest rates and inflation, which are transmitted through open 
market operations and the discount rate. 10 
An increase in the discount rate forces banks to charge more for loans, 
hence slowing the level of borrowing and dampening investment demand. A 
slowdown in the levels of investment slows the growth of producer demand for 
all inputs- labor and capital. This slowdown in turn causes real wages to 
stagnate or even drop, causing consumption to be reduced and initiating a fall 
in aggregate demand (Dornbusch and Fischer 1994). 
Understanding the importance of the fluctuating value of financial 
assets on the macroeconomy provides a linkage to the role of monetary policy 
in stimulating financial innovation. The level and volatility of interest rates 
have generated certain types of financial innovations (see table 1), which can 
act as impulses upon the money supply. 
l<>r'ho discount rate is the interest rate charged by the Federal Reserve Bank to member 
banks that borrow (rom it to meet temporary rese rve needs. 
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CHAPTER II 
A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
The U.S. banking industry has evolved significantly during the 1980s. 
However, the financial innovation evolutionary process follows a unique path 
with commonalities between the principal developed countries. Table 3 
presents a summary of the key economic variables across the Group of Seven 
(G-7) countries. A visual inspection provides the reader with a useful 
understanding of how different each country's financial markets are relative 
to each other. 
The selected group of countries and time period have both economic and 
historical connotations. The four European countries were colonial powers, to 
varying degrees, for several centuries. The quasi-mercantilism they practiced 
came to an abrupt halt in the 1950s and 1960s. 
As the decolonialization process evolved, nations worldwide utilized 
various policies to stimulate growth and development. Selected European 
countries, Japan, and the United States all became members of the 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) in 1959 
and 1960 as many transnational organizations like the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to take hold. 
The financial markets in the G-7 countries had varying degrees of 
importance. One must recall that the Keynesian revolution was at its hiatus. 
15 
TABLE 3 
RELATIVE E CONOMI C COMI'A){ISON OJ' THE G-7 COUNTRIES (1993) 
Co untr 
United United 
Category States Japan Germa ny Kingdom France Italy Canada 
Population (in mil.) 262 125 81 58 57 57 23 
Marke t cap/GNP* .35 .3 1 27 .75 .22 . 12 32 
Mutual fund/G NP .40 . 14 04 . II .30 .06 17 
Bond market/G NP** I 55(e) 90 85 69 87 I 65(e) 1.20(e) 
PensiOn reserves/GNP .33 . 17 07 .51 .07 02 .25 
Trade dependency1 21% 58% 56% 35% 30% 38% 40% 
Foreign bank profit 
share: 0.05 NA NA .22(e) . 16(e) NA NA 
SOUl!CES: Morgan Stanley Cap ital International 1995; Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith 
1992; Bank of England 1991; Bank of Ca nada 1994; Bank of France 1994; Dankoflta ly 1995; 
Marsh 1992; McLean 1993; OECD 1994; OECD 1986 anti 199 I; and author's own estimates (o) . 
*Represents the total stock market capitalization relative to GNP. 
**The Italian lira bond market is dominated by government borrowing, including both 
federal and loca l municipalities. Over 85 percent of the outstanding balance of debt issues 
a rc governme nt-sponsored or guaranteed . 
tRepresents the sum of a country's imports and exports as a percentage of GNP. 
~Inc share that foreign banks represent of total domestic commercial bank profits afte r 
lax 
NA = not available. 
Government and, to a certain extent, business believed that production and 
particular areas of finance could be organized more efficiently at the state level 
than at the individual level. 
This led to the nationalization or the heavy regulation of a large 
percentage of the industrial base, particularly in the automobile, energy, 
telecommunications, mining, and airline industries. The financial sector also 
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came under scrutiny in countries like France, where the four largest banks 
were nationalized in 1981. 11 
In the U.S., the role of depositary institutions has been to handle market 
imperfections. Market imperfections are defined by the existence of varying 
transaction costs for indivisible assets. 
The period between 1960 and 1990 has been marked primarily by a shift 
of household assets away from traditional depositary institutions and time 
deposits to other investment vehicles as the level of substitutability increased. 
Substitutability improved as transaction costs diminished, access to 
different asset classes existed, better information became available, and 
markets became less deregulated. 
Table 4 highlights the distribution of U.S. household financial assets 
over time. The principal conclusion is that tax-favored vehicles like pension 
funds and mutual funds were the asset classes of choice. 12 The traditional 
vehicles that historically have composed household investment-corporate 
equities , bonds, and bank deposits- have dropped substantially. 
The composition of the British personal sector is somewhat different but 
yet similar when it comes to a large percentage being allocated to life 
11 1 n t he U.K. and Ca nada, banks were required to invest up to 50 perce nt in 
government-related instruments or loans to subsidize the state's budgetary needs. [n Germany, 
ba nks were required to maintain very high levels of liquidity and worked closely with t he 
govern me nt. to invest in strategic business areas. 
12Since 1990, shareholders of mutual fund s are required to pay taxes on all capital gai ns 
ea rned during each tax yea r. 
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TABLE 4 
COMPOSITION OF H OUSEHOLD FINANCIAL AsSETS IN THE U.S. (PERCENT) 
e d 
Ca tegory 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Total deposits* 17.5 20.6 25.4 21.71 
Total government securities* * 6. 1 4.0 3.0 3.3 
Total Credit Market Instrumentst 5.4 5.2 4.4 6.0 
Corporate Equities 26.8 28.8 14.3 12.8 
Investment Related Mutual Funds1 1.1 1.8 0.8 3. 1 
Money Market Mutual Fund Shares 0 0 0.4 2.5 
Pension Fund Reserves 6.3 9.4 14. 1 23.5 
Life Insurance Reserves 6.6 5.3 4.3 2.6 
Pension and Mutual Fund Assets as 
a% of Household Financial Assets 12.9 16.5 19.3 3 1.7 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board 1994. 
*Total deposits = checkable deposits and currency plus small time and savings deposits 
plus large deposits. 
**Total U.S . government securities = savi ngs bonds plus other Treasury issues plus 
agency issues. 
tTotal credit market instruments= tax-exempt plus corporate and fore ign bonds plus 
open-market paper. 
trnvest.ment-re lated mutual fund s are eq uity, bond, and income mutual fund s. 
insurance companies and pension funds. 13 Table 5 illustrates the distribution 
of the U.K. personal sector from 1970-90. To make an adequate comparison 
of tables 4 and 5, certain categories must be combined or certain items deleted. 
The percentages in tables 4 and 5 do not add to 100 since real assets , security 
credit, and miscellaneous assets are excluded. 
13U.S. life insurance companies lost a share of household financial assets while British 
insurers increased. This has been attributed to the fact that U.S . insurers were s low to provide 
competitive returns to policyholders while portfolio managers at British insurers wcro mord 
innovative and invested heavily in U.K. equities and real estate. 
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TABLE 5 
U.K. P ERSONAL S ECTOR: SELECTED FINANCIAL AsSET STOCKS ( PE RCENT) 
Period 
Ca tegory 1970 1980 1990 
Sterling M 3 14.2 15. 2 11.6 
Na tiona l savings 5. 1 4. 1 4.9 
Buudin g socie ties 16.5 16.7 16 .2 
U.K. co mpany secunlles 16.5 13.5 13 
Umt trust umts I I I 1.5 
Equ1ty in life insura nce a nd 
pen swn fund s 29.6 33.6 40.7 
Over cas assets 1.2 1. 2 1.5 
SOURCE: BankofEngland 1991. 
It is difficult again to draw strong conclusions from table 4 concerning 
the level of substitutability between asset classes. The category entitled 
''Equity in life insurance and pension reserves" saw a substantial jump relative 
to the category entitled "U.K. company securities." However, equity-related 
investment vehicles like life insurance and pension reserves enjoy attractive 
tax benefits compared to direct investment in corporate securities. In some 
ways, no clear trend is shown because the tax benefit essentially is a 
government subsidy that acts as a natural attractor for personal savings at the 
margin. 
The overseas sector has a particularly important role in the U.K. 
financial system. The banking system is of primary relevance to the overseas 
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sector in terms of provision of funds to U.K. financial intermediaries, and, in 
this respect, foreign currency transactions dominate (Curwen 1987). 
The French and Italian (the Latin nation-states in the G-7) markets 
have evolved very differently. The principal focus of household financial assets 
has been capital preservation as opposed to financial returns. Historically, 
both countries' capital markets have been very volatile, unstable, and 
considered by the public as money losers. 
The household sector in France has, on average, accounted for more 
than 40 percent of total gross savings over the past 30 years and has been the 
most important source of new capital for industry. The problem is that only 
a very small proportion of these funds is in a form that industry can use 
directly, as most private savings are in cash or short-term deposits with banks 
and savings institutions. The French government over the years has granted 
certain liquid savings a more attractive tax treatment than other long-term 
investments. 
The figures in table 6 highlight this- in 1970, only 2 percent of 
household savings is allocated to long-term savings vehicles like life insurance, 
pensions, and corporate securities. 
Institutional investors (i.e. , insurers, pension funds, and fund 
managers) in the 1960s and 1970s were heavily regulated and relatively minor 
players in the capital markets. Life insurers in France were required to invest 
TABLE 6 
COMPOSITION OF FRENCH H OUSE HOLDS' H OLDTNGS IN FINANC IAL 
AsSr;TS (P ERCENT) 
Period 
Catego ry 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Fra nc l'v1 3 37.0 39 0 44 .0 35.0 
Eq uity in lifo insurance and 
pension reserves 2.0 2.0 3.0 7.0 
Mu t ua l fund s 0 0 2.0 15 0 
All sccunties 7.0 20 3.0 5.0 
Othe r assets 20.0 24 .0 20.0 17.0 
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SOURCE: Rapport sur les Co mptes de Ia Nation, 197 1; Bank of Prance 1994, a nd OECD 
1994 . 
at least 50 percent of their technical reserves in the currency of the risks they 
cover to obviate the exchange risk. 
In the early 1980s, French authorities gave insurers more flexibility in 
investing their reserves. Currently, there are no statutory percentage 
requirements concerning the asset class or currency but, rather, regulators 
focus on the coherency of the insurer's investment policy. 14 
In 1970, French fund managers were required to hold 90 percent of their 
portfolios in quoted securities with no more than 5 percent in any one 
company. In addition, 30 percent of their investment must be in bonds or 
11Asse t· li a bili t~· management has beco me a common buzzword for insurance regulators 
w11h in the EEC lO assure the mselves that lntcrcst·scns itivc liabilities arc adequa te ly covc rC'cl . 
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liquid assets. Their role in the overall capitalization of the Paris Bourse barely 
approached 4 percent (Readman et a!. 1977). 
The genesis of financial innovation in modern times began in the 1960s 
as the credit and depository markets became international. The major event 
was the establishment of the Eurodollar market despite tighter currency 
controls in the U.K. In 1968, Office of Financial and Depository Institutions 
(OFDI) regulations forced U.S. investment banks and corporations to 
undertake numerous new bond issues.15 
During the 1950s and 1960s, European borrowers turned to New York 
to obtain funds , borrowing and selling their dollars to banks, which often 
added them to the banks' reserves. This caused a "deficit" for the U.S. 
government, according to the liquidity definition of equilibrium, in the balance 
of payments used by the government. 
The principal owners were European investors who accepted a lower 
yield than that available in other countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Switzerland, presumably in exchange for a more liquid asset with a 
broader secondary market and, therefore, a better likelihood of being converted 
into cash without a sharp price decline. These three countries maintained 
interest rates below those of other European countries by limiting access of 
15The OFDI was within t he U.S. Depa rtment of Treasury. It ha d broad power s t.o 
superv ise the complia nce of banking institutions to laws legisla ted by Co ngress. The Federa l 
Depositors Insura nce Co mpany (FDI C) a nd the Federa l Reserve Bank focused more upon the 
fi na ncia l solvency of ba nking institutions than on legal complia nce. 
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foreign borrowers to their capital markets. The maintenance of low interest 
rates permitted the domestic government to borrow at the low rates. 
U.S. authorities were critical of the European government stating that 
they were riddled with a monopoly that diverted borrowers to New York. With 
competition, American bankers believed that if Europeans would borrow in 
Europe, the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments would be relieved. 
The European view of the problem is that Europe and the U.S. had 
different preferences for liquidity. So Europeans borrowed long and lent short 
to gain the liquidity needed in Europe and available in the U.S. (Kindleberger 
1965, 1984). 
However, research showed that the European credit markets 
discriminated in favor of domestic borrowers, especially national governments, 
and against foreign borrowers, particularly in regulations governing the 
investment funds from savings banks, insurance companies, etc. (European 
Commission 1967, p. 15). 
The political and regulatory environments contributed to the 
development of the Eurodollar market as well. Investors of dollar deposits in 
European banks could escape Regulation Q and obtain marginally higher rates 
of return on their money. Secondly , certain types of major financial 
institutions (i .e., the Russian State Bank) could safely deposit their funds in 
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dollars outside the U.S. where the chances of their being affected by political 
incident were reduced. 
The economics of the Eurodollar market and its influence on U.S. 
monetary policy generated substantial debate. Some argued that the shift of 
a dollar deposit to a European bank (or European branch of an American 
bank) could be regarded as an increase in reserves in the Eurodollar market, 
which then could be loaned and reloaned to borrowers who could put the 
money back into the system or pay it to people who could do so. This could 
expand the money supply in multiple fashion and could be comparable to an 
increase in the primary reserves of a national banking system (Friedman 1969, 
1970). 
The process could be cut off if the original borrower spent the dollars in 
the United States so that they could not be redeposited in the Eurocurrency 
market. In this case, the possibilities of multiple expansion exist, where the 
recipient of the borrowed funds generally does not return them to the savings 
and loan system and the same dollar is saved and relent outside the United 
States (Klopstock 1968, pp. 3-9). 
Klopstock's view held in the early stages as dollars were borrowed by 
those entities that wanted to spend in dollars. However, as the market 
evolved, dollars were borrowed for stockpiling needs or by Europeans who did 
not want to be short of dollars , and then sold to a central bank against local 
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funds. When the central bank redeposited the dollars in the Eurodollar 
market , a basis was laid for relending and multiple expansion. 
The Eurobond market was developed for similar reasons because of 
onerous registration requirements by the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and also in part due to the Interest Equalization Tax (lET) imposed by 
the U.S. in 1963 on bond interest to stop European countries from borrowing 
in the U.S .16 
U.S. banks were forced to develop new products to compensate for the 
erosion of their depositor base further stimulated by the volatile interest rate 
environment of the 1980s and the increased globalization of financial markets. 
The most widely used by U.S. banks is the swap product. The first 
currency swap was engineered in London in 1979.17 During the following two 
years, the swap market remained undeveloped. In 1981, Salomon Brothers 
put together what is now the landmark currency swap involving the World 
Bank and IBM. In the same year the first interest rate swap took place in 
London. Later in the U.S., the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie 
Mae) employed a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap to convert the 
interest-rate character of some of its liabilities. 
"'rhe I ET was a tax levied upon fore1gn borrowers, primarily E uropea n, based on the 
differe ntial between the U.S . and the foreign borrower's domestic interest rate. 
17London controls over 30 percent of the world's fore ign exchange market with New Yo rk 
being second . Nonetheless, U.S . banks have had a very visible presence in t he London market 
thro ugh branch offices or subsidia ri es. 
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Once established, the market for currency and interest rate swaps grew 
rapidly. From under $5 billion in combined notional principal outstanding at 
the end of 1982, the market grew to over $3.5 trillion by the end of 1993. 
Initially U.S. banks acted in the role of brokers. That is, they would find 
potential counterparties with matched needs and, for a commission, would 
assist the parties in the negotiation of a swap agreement. Soon afterward, 
many of the major banks began to operate as dealers and played the role of a 
counterparty. This was possible because of the existence of a large cash 
market for the U.S. Treasury debt and well-developed futures markets in 
which the swap dealers could hedge their resultant exposures. 
Commodity swaps were first introduced in 1986 by Chase Manhattan 
Bank but did not flourish until the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFI'C) issued a favorable ruling in 1989 granting the "safe harbor," provided 
that certain criteria were met. By the end of 1989, the volume of commodity 
swaps outstanding was nearly $8 billion. 
The futures markets, particularly financial futures , emerged from 
obscurity in the 1970s. The world's principal futures and options market is the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CMC) followed by the London International 
Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE). Both markets have 
developed futures for a variety of fixed income instruments in most of the 
principal currencies and offer stock market index futures for S&P stock index 
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and the FT-SE. Financial futures differ from commodity futures in several 
ways. Probably the most important is that many financial futures are not 
deliverable in the traditional sense. The delivery process associated with 
commodity futures restricts the actual delivery to a narrow delivery period. 
Within the bounds of the delivery period, the actual time of delivery is left to 
the discretion of the short, or the lender of the security. This suggests that the 
short will notify the clearing association that delivery will be made. The long 
(the purchaser) makes payment and the short turns over warehouse receipts 
that evidence ownership of the stored commodity. 
The last major product area that developed were put and call options. 
Until the mid-1970s, puts and calls were traded over-the-counter. In 1975, the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) was established. Since then, the 
organized trading of options increased significantly where today options are 
traded on individual stocks, on stock indexes, and on futures contracts 
(Marshall and Bansal 1992). 
The creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) was the final big 
change in western financial markets, particularly among the selected group of 
countries. Two powerful forces moved the drive to European monetary 
unification: (1) continuation of the integration movement in its various 
aspects-commercial, economic, financial , and, possibly, political; and 
(2) growing weakness of the dollar as a world currency. 
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The EMS came into being in 1978, replacing the old snake system. 18 All 
the EEC members, except the United Kingdom, participated in the new EMS 
structure. The EMS offered more specific guidelines for central bankers. The 
new system provides two major types of central bank interventions to 
maximize exchange rate stability among EEC currencies. The first type of 
intervention is compulsory and enters into effect whenever the exchange rate 
between a pair of participating currencies departs by more than 2.25 percent 
from the official parity rate of one currency in terms of the other. 19 
The second type ofintramargin central bank intervention is based on a 
new criterion, the "divergence indicator." Under the terms of the EMS, the 
central bank of an EEC country is "presumed to act" whenever the "divergence 
indicator" for its currency crosses the "divergence threshold."20 
The implications of the EMS were evaluated in the Cecchini Report of 
1988, which stated that the establishment of a single and free European 
1
"'f'h c "snake" was a conti nuation of the old Smithsonian agreement of March 1972, by 
which exchange rate (]uctuations between any two EEC currencies were restricted . The 
objective was to establish narrower fluctuation bands of 2.25 percent. The first cri sis occurred 
in July 1972, where expectations of high inflation and a growing balance-of- payments deficit 
provoked a llight from the pound, forci ng the Bank of England to withdraw from the s nake. 
19 An exception was made in the case of the Italian lira; the Italian currency was 
ex plicitly aUowed to fluctuate within margins of 6 percent around its centra l rate. 
110The "divergence indicator'' is calculated by the following formula : 
(I) P or D = ECU market - ECU ce ntral!ECU central x 100 
(2) Dr = P or DIMDS x 100 
where P = premium, D = discount, Dl = divergence indicator, and MDS = maximum divergence 
spread . 
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market will boost intra-EEC investment and sharpen business competition 
within the community area. Increased competition will lower costs and prices. 
The disappearance of frontier controls on the cross/border movement of goods 
will cause an immediate fall in goods' prices as the costs of their distribution 
decline. The report estimated that the single European market would raise the 
community's annual rate of economic growth by 5 percent, would cause prices 
to fall by 6 percent, and would improve external balances by 1 percent. In 
addition, the report predicted that, as a consequence of its formation , the 
single market would create 1.8 million jobs (Lieberman 1992). 
In 1991, the Maastricht Treaty was enacted, whereby the EMS would 
enter its final phase of convergence toward a common currency. The treaty 
imposed further requirements upon EEC countries to bring their domestic 
budget deficits and inflation in line. The treaty requires that, in order for a 
country to participate in the new EMS scheduled for 1998, budgetary deficits 
cannot exceed 3 percent.2 1 Recently, the European union gave the proposed 
single currency a name-the Euro--and reiterated that monetary union would 
begin on January 1, 1999. 
Figure 2 illustrates the current level of inflation and budget deficits of 
the selected European countries relative to the Maastricht 3 percent objective. 
21 The Maastricht Treaty included the 12 EEC coun t ries-Prance, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Netherla nds, Luxembourg, Belgium, ltaly, Ire land , Greece, Denmark, Spain, and 
Portugal. In 1994, three new countries entered the EEC a nd have committed to co mplying with 
the trea ty-Sweden, Finland, a nd Au stria . 
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The more advanced economies- Germany, Britain, and France-appear to be 
closer to achieving the specified inflationary and budgetary objectives, while 
Italy struggles with excessively generous social programs and large 
deficit-ridden government services- railroads, airlines, postal services, etc. 
The response by commercial banks within the G-7 countries to 
increasing competition and financial innovation has varied. Figure 3 presents 
a comparison of the return on equity and tier 1 capital ratio of the major banks 
of the four European G-7 member countries and the U.S. The graph indicates 
that the U.K. and U.S. banking institutions have fared well and have 
successfully diversified into other financial products that are not lending 
based, but fee based. Also, European banks have been slow to implement new 
processing technologies to reduce the unit cost of financial transactions. This 
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has caused European banks to earn half of what their U.S. counterparts do, 
with the exception of the U.K. banks. 
As a result, the declining levels of profitability will cause banking 
institutions in these countries to have diminished clout in the EEC and 
international financial circles. Evidence of this has already appeared as no 
French or Italian bank was a candidate to acquire Barings, SG Warburg, or 
Klein wort Benson (Calian, Steinmetz, and Sesit 1996).22 
22These three British merchan t banks were recently acquired by Dutch, Swi ss, and 
German banks when they had severe financial troubles or were made lucrative purchase offers 
in the last three yea rs. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
The evolution of financial innovation as stated earlier has both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic effects. The microeconomic effects have 
surfaced by changing the underlying economic incentives of the banking 
system . U.S. banks that once relied on a stable supply of customer deposits 
and a steady demand for credit have seen their funding sources change 
substantially and face more competition for qualified borrowers. 
In the U.S. , banks have reacted in response to financial reform, which 
has come from different directions. Events such as the problems of the thrift 
industry, lesser developed countries (LDC) debt, increased bank failures, and 
the recent stock market crash have caused concern.23 More subtle, perhaps, 
but no less important are longer term trends, such as the erosion of traditional 
roles of financial institutions, development of new and esoteric types of 
financial instruments, and the globalization of world financial markets. 
Financial innovation, according to most Federal Reserve authorities, is 
one of the principal reasons that market imperfections are breaking down , 
modifying the raison d'etre for the existence of depositary institutions. The 
.,l'he ra te of bank failures in 1986 and 1987 was at an all-time high except for the 1920s 
a nd 1930s. The writeo ffs of third-world debt for the 1980s reached over U.S.S50 billion . Th e 
tra ding losses due to the 1987 stock market crash a nd the 1989 stock marke t meltdown were 
virt ua lly incalculable. 
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traditional role of banks has been to collect deposits from the public in varied 
amounts and then lend these funds to individuals and corporations. The 
depositary institution essentially corrects the market imperfection by bridging 
the gap between savers and lenders (Greenbaum and Thakor 1995). 
The traditional argument that banks are special rests on: (1) the role 
that banks play as sources of liquidity, (2) the importance of bank liabilities 
as money, and (3) the inherent liquidity problem banks face because certain 
bank liabilities are redeemable at par on very short notice whereas their assets 
are not. These roles have changed as technologically driven financial 
innovations have modified the role of traditional deposit taking. 
The liabilities that serve the function of money, demand deposits and 
short-term time deposits, have increased. Checks are routinely written on 
savings (NOW) accounts at both banks and savings and loans (S&Ls), and 
mutual savings banks offer checking accounts, and credit unions offer share 
drafts. Debit cards are the equivalent of a check. Through the use of computer 
technology, debit cards reduce float for the issuing institution, which now must 
be paid for if the Federal Reserve paper check-clearing services are used. 
More important than these new substitutes for demand deposit 
payments are methods that evolved to reduce the need for large dollar balance 
holders to hold funds in transaction accounts. A host of cash management 
devices, such as zero balance accounts, deposit scanning, and lockbox 
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arrangements, are employed to collect funds that would otherwise be held in 
th e form of idle balances and channel them into instruments yielding a 
positive rate of return. As a result, most large and increasingly small dollar 
depositors have benefitted from the ease and reduced costs of converting 
interest-bearing financial assets into demand deposits, indicating that the 
traditional function of money balances as a source of liquidity has become less 
and less unique or important (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 1987). 
Market developments have eroded commercial bank advantages over the 
direct credit markets. Bank liabilities no longer perform a unique function in 
the banking system. 
The evolution of the innovations that changed the relative share of the 
banking system among total financial intermediary assets between 1960 and 
1990 in the U.S. is shown in table 7. 
TABLE 7 
U .S . RELATIVE SHARES OF TOTAL FINANCIAL lNTERMEDlARY AsSETS, 1960-90 
Fina ncia l Intermediary 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Commercial banks 38.6 38.5 37.2 26 .8 
Thrifts 20. 1 20.8 23.3 16.0 
I nsura nee co mpamcs 2'1.0 19. 1 17.4 19. 1 
Penston and tru st 9.8 13 0 13.0 19 3 
I nvcstmcnt co mpanies 2.9 :l 7 3.7 10 9 
Fmancc companies 1.7 3. 7 5.3 79 
SOt 'RCE: Fede ral Reserve Board 1960- 1990. 
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A second microeconomic effect , and the focus of this dissertation's 
research, is the proliferation of new financial products. The advent of interest 
rate swaps, futures/options, and foreign exchange trading have changed the 
strategic business direction of many of the largest U.S. banks. The "new" 
products adopted by bankers have grown in demand as corporations and 
nonbank financial institutions have sought new ways to manage risk. 
The new product innovations introduced by banks have attempted to 
make markets more complete and efficient. Below is a brief explanation of 
these product innovations and their role in modern finance. 
A. Interest Rate Swaps 
An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange 
a series of interest payments without exchanging the underlying debt. In a 
classic swap transaction, fixed-for-floating rate swap, one party promises to 
pay the counterparty at designated intervals an amount of interest calculated 
at a fixed rate on a given principal amount (called the notional value of the 
swap); the counterparty promises to pay at the same intervals a variable rate 
of interest on the same principal calculated according to a floating-rate index. 
A single amount is transferred at each payment date to cover the net difference 
in the interest payments instead of exchanging the gross interest payments 
(Kim and Koppenhaver 1992). 
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The use of swaps by U.S. banks has been attributed to attempts to 
complement or substitute for other off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities. The 
literature cites three main justifications for the existence of interest rate swap 
markets: reduces debt issuance costs, helps complete the set of financial 
markets available to traders, and helps complete the set of financial markets 
available in taxation and regulation across different debt markets. 
Bricksler and Chen (1986) reason that the benefits from an interest rate 
swap are the comparative funding cost advantage between borrowers; a firm 
\vith a low credit rating can effectively lower its fixed-rate financing costs by 
borrowing short-term, floating-rate funds , and swappin g the interest with a 
high-rated company, instead of issuing corporate bonds. The reduction in 
financing cost is possible because the quality spread in the short-term, 
floating-rate market is typically narrower for the low-rated firm than in the 
long-term, fixed-rate market. Bricksler and Chen suggest differential 
information among investors and institutional restrictions as two possible 
sources of market imperfections and the comparative funding cost advantage 
among different borrowers. 
Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman (1986) argue that interest rate swaps 
can be characterized as a series of forward contracts and complete the set of 
financial markets available to traders. Sometimes credit markets to certain 
types of borrowers are illiquid with long-dated forward markets in debt 
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securities. They continue by stating that swaps can contribute to the 
integration of financial markets by allowing market participants to fill gaps 
left by inactive or incomplete markets. Interest rate swaps can also be used to 
create new financial instruments. For example, the combination of fixed-rate 
loan and an interest rate swap, in which the borrower makes fixed-rate 
payments, produces a reverse floating-rate loan; if interest rates rise, the net 
interest payments on the loan fall . 
The size of the interest rate swap market by the end of 1994 reached a 
notional value of $4 trillion dollars. Interest rate swaps represent about 30 
percent of the financial derivatives market and over 60 percent of derivatives 
related to interest rates 
B. Interest Rate Futures and Options 
A future trading position captures a bank's experience with related 
off-balance sheet activities that can be used to manage interest rate risk. 
Futures also test for any complementarities between exchange-traded and 
over-the-counter interest rate risk management instruments. For example, a 
bank that provides swap market intermediary services makes a market in 
interest rate swaps to accommodate the needs of its customers. Matching or 
offsetting swap contracts may not be offered to the swap broker at the same 
time, in which case the bank is exposed to interest rate risk as the swap 
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counterparty. Unmatched interest rate swaps can be temporarily hedged with 
a strip or interest rate future contract. 
Interest rate options represent a right, not an obligation, to buy or sell 
a fixed income security at a fixed price sometime in the future or upon some 
contractual arrangement. Many variations exist-options on options and 
options on interest rate swap transactions (Gartland, Nicholas, and Fabozzi 
1996). 
The size of the interest-rate futures and forwards contracts at the end 
of 1994 represented $3.2 trillion while the volume of interest rate options 
reached $1.8 trillion (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 1995). 
C. Asset Securitization 
According to Blanco and Fawson (forthcoming), asset securitization 
simply stated is the practice of financial intermediaries originating loans and 
using financial markets to seek investors who are willing to hold a portfolio of 
packaged securitized assets. The advent of securitization has transformed 
traditional corporate and mortage lending in the last 20 years. 
The growth in mortgage lending has been attributed to the growth in 
securitization since loan demand is no longer constrained by bank balance 
sheet limitations, but rather by the relationship between the yield curve and 
the reservation rate of interest paid by borrowers for mortgages. 
The volume of all securitized assets was approximately $3 trillion at the 
end of 1993. 
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The principal macroeconomic implication has been the changing infor-
mational content of the attempts by central banks in the G-7 group to control 
monetary aggregates. 24 The discount rate has had a different level of economic 
influence across countries. Bonomo, Ferris, and Lamy (1994) reviewed the 
impact of changes in the central bank discount rates across a number of OECD 
countries and measured the subsequent changes in equity, bond, and money 
market prices. The influence upon capital markets can help determine the 
relative influence the central bank may have on the economy. 
A strong relationship between the discount rate and the direction of 
asset prices (whether positive or negative) should indicate a high level of 
influence of the central bank on financial markets. 
A second implication of the Bonomo, Ferris, and Lamy study is that a 
high degree of sensitivity between the discount rate and capital markets can 
be considered a measure of sophistication of each country's financial system. 
A concern in interpreting table 8 too literally is understanding the true role of 
the discount rate within each country's monetary policy. In the United States, 
all capital markets were strongly influenced by the discount rate. 
The results were mixed for the other selected countries where 
institutional investors, primarily commercial banks, insurance companies, and 
fund managers, were required to hold a certain portion of the reserves or funds 
2
"Thc three tools commonly cons idered available LO central bankers to control th e money 
supply arc open marke l opcration s, the rcscrv<' reqUirement, and 1he di scount rate . 
TABLE 8 
IMPACT OF CH.<\NGES IN THE CENTRAL BANK DISCOUNT RATE UPON 
FINANCIALMARKETS, 1960-89 
Country Asset Class 
Equity Bond Money* 
United States Strong Strong Strong 
Japan Strong None Strong 
Germany Strong Weak Strong 
United Kingdom Weak None Strong 
France Strong None Strong 
Italy None Weak Strong 
Canada Weak Weak Strong 
SOURCE: Bonomo, Ferris, and Lamy 1994. 
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*In Bonomo, Ferris, and Lamy (1994), there was no direct measurement 
of money markets per se, but an analysis of the short-term interest rates is 
considered in the literature as a reliable proxy. 
in fixed income securities. Particularly in the cases of France and Italy, credit 
ceilings were imposed statutorily, prohibiting the clearance of credit markets 
in a fluid fashion . Also, in the case of selected European countries, the 
capitalization of the equity markets fluctuated over the last 30 years based on 
the nationalization of major financial institutions and industrial companies. 
The worst cases were in France and the United Kingdom. In France, during 
the early 1980s, massive nationalizations of the major banks, insurance 
companies, and industrial companies occurred in all the principal areas of 
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production (steel, shipbuilding, cement, etc.). This directly and indirectly 
eliminated overnight about 20 percent of the Paris bourse's market 
capitalization.25 
In the U.K., the opposite occurred as major industrial firms were 
privatized, increasing the market capitalization weighting of nonfinancial or 
industrial firms relative to financial institutions. The privatization of 
industrial companies under the Thatcher conservative government increased 
the market capitalization by 7 percent.26 
25tfhe indirect effects a rc that ftrms were nationalized if they were a subsidiary or 
co ntrolled affiiliate of the nationa lized finan cial institu tion. 
'JJlA secondary impact is the internationalization of the London Stock Excha nge, which, 
in fact, is ca lled the International Stock E xchange. British fLrms represen ted about 43 percent 
of tho market capitalization. Thi s likely explains t ho wea k re lationship be tween the evolution 
of theFT AU-Shares index and the Bank of England's discount ra te since non-British ftrm s are 
nol affected by sterling interest rates or credit limitatio ns. 
CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF BANK HEDGING 
POLICY AND PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 
A. Hedging Policy in Perfect and 
Complete Markets 
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The nature of financial innovation has unique implications for U.S. 
commercial banks. The advent of a continually eroding deposit base and 
increased nonbank competition has forced U.S. commercial banks to cultivate 
new product ideas. Also, U.S. banks have been forced to accept additional 
business risks in the form of interest rate and exchange rate exposure in order 
to accommodate customer needs. 
Within the framework of financial innovation, U.S. banks are uniquely 
positioned to be both on the supply and demand sides. The demand side is 
derived from the need to hedge interest rate and exchange rate exposure on the 
traditional business activities of banks (lending, letters of credit, etc.). The 
supply side is the opportunistic nature of profit maximizing firms, like banks, 
to capitalize on the needs of clients who seek to hedge. These client needs may 
be providing forward interest and exchange rates for trade, swaps to cover an 
interest rate mismatch, or financial futures and options to cover the unhedged 
portion, or basis risk, of a hedge already undertaken. 
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In the seminal work ofModigliani and Miller (1958), a hedging firm has 
been limited to three variables- taxes, contracting costs, and investment 
decisions. According to Modigliani and Miller (a firm with a fixed investment 
policy with no contracting costs or taxes), corporate financing policy is 
irrelevant. They argue that if a firm decides to change its hedging policy, 
investors who hold claims issued by the firm can change their holdings of risky 
assets to offset the change in the firm's hedging policy, leaving the distribution 
of their future wealth unaffected. This assumes that markets are perfect and 
complete, making the firm's hedging policy independent of its underlying 
value. For example, if a firm hedges the value of an input by purchasing 
forward contracts and that input price rises, the firm's pricing and production 
policies should not be affected by the existence of the hedge. The opportunity 
cost of the input is its current price, not the (sunk) cost of the forward contract. 
This, of course, suggests t:.at a firm can pass the increased price of the 
input to the final consumer through a higher overall product price without a 
reduction in its operating margin. 
A definition of hedging is provided by Smith and Stulz (1985). A hedge 
is loosely defined as a trade in a particular future, forward, or option market, 
also referred to as derivatives, even though there is no identifiable cash 
position in the underlying commodity. A firm may also hedge by changing its 
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underlying operating decisions.27 
Banks operate in many ways similar to a traditional firm in its demand 
for a hedge. Adapting Smith and Stulz's (1985) work to banks alone lays the 
groundwork for further analysis of bank hedge policy. 
The nature of the financial risk may sometimes provide incentives for 
banks to take positions in derivatives. If the effective risk at the maTgin on 
banking institutions is an increasing function of a bank's market value, then 
the risk-adjusted value of the bank is a concave function of its market value. 
If hedging reduces the variability of bank market values, the expected bank 
risk level is reduced and the expected ma1·ket value of the bank is increased, 
as long as the cost of the hedge is not excessive. Line A of figure 4 illustrates 
how the unhedged market value of a bank grows at a decreasing rate as the 
risk level of banks increases at an accelerating rate. 
Line B illustrates how the risk-adjusted market value of the bank 
increases at an accelerating rate until the risk level is so great that, while the 
market value of the bank may increase, the risk-adjusted value does not 
increase. 28 
27 /\ merger, for example , ca n achiCvc the sa me results as hedging through financ1al 
contracts. 
280 nc co uld eve n postulate that th e n sk-adjusted bank value may actually drop eve n 
af 1 he market value of th e bank incrca!:iCS af th e risk of loss is greater than · I for every $ 1 
mcrcase 111 market va lue. 
R1sk 
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E(R) 
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Bank Market Val 
VQ Bank Market Value 
FIG. 4.-Bank risk levels and risk-adjusted market value as a function 
of bank market value. 
VJVJ 
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E(V R) 
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C* 
: market va lue of the ba nk without hedging when sta te a lbJ occurs 
: expected market value of firm wi thout hedging 
: expected risk level wi thout hedgin g 
: bank risk level with a costless, perfect hedge 
: expected risk adju sted bank valu e without hedging 
: r isk adjusted bank value with a costless, perfect hedge 
: maximum cost of hedging where hedgin g is profitable 
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The influence of hedging is the difference between E(V- R) and 
E(V- R:H). This suggests that the risk-adjusted market value of the bank will 
diminish less than the absolute level of risk, E(R) minus E(R:H). 
The growth of the bank's market value is a function of the level of risk 
that a bank is willing to accept. Risk is loosely defined as any economic event 
that may contribute to the variability or reduction of a bank's shareholder 
equity value, either capital or current profit levels. 
V(O) = EP,(V,- R(V;) V,) (1) 
Equation (1) represents the risk-adjusted market value of a bank, where 
Pi is the price today of one dollar to be delivered in the state of the world i, 
typically the bank's market share price.29 R(VJ is the risk level or "rate" of 
risk if the market value of the bank is vi. 
V "(O)- V(O) = P.(R( V.) V.- R(V. + H. )(V. + H.> ) 
+ Pb( R ( Vb) Vb - R( Vb + Hb)( Vb +!Jb) ) > 0 
(2) 
Hedging can increase the market value of a bank if there exist two 
states of the world, a and b, such that R(V.) < R(V J. This is true if a bank 
holds a hedged portfolio such that v. +H. = Vb + Hb, and that the hedge 
portfolio is self-financing in the sense that P.H. + PbH b = 0. The last 
29In eoonomic theory, a fum's, in our case a bank's , share price represe nt.s not only the 
market's evaluation of the firm's current value but a lso incorporates all the expectational 
information about the evolution of future profits co nsidering all available information . 
In format ion is complete and perfect in our current scenario, suggesti ng that a ll future 
mform atio n is incorporated into the share price. 
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expression suggests that Ha and Hb are both equal to zero where the cost of 
each hedge is costless. 
Given an environment of costless hedges, banks are assumed not to 
participate in derivative markets where hedges have explicit costs. A bank's 
hedge strategy is limited to strategic behavior it may undertake to avoid or 
diminish risk as its market value may decrease or increase. For example, in 
an environment with increasing marginal tax rates, a bank's aggregate tax 
liability will increase at an accelerating rate as its market value increases, 
denoted by line A in figure 4. Line B reflects the posttax market value of the 
bank. It will increase at a decelerating rate until the marginal tax rate 
reaches 100 percent. 
An appropriate hedge, that would be costless as well, would be 
accelerating the depreciation of fixed assets (i.e., real estate) or of goodwill to 
reduce pretax earnings. The implementing of such a strategy by banks would 
increase a bank's posttax value until E(V)-C* = E(V- R: I 0 or E(V) = E(V- R: ~0 + C*. 
Another example in the case of banks would be for the creation of 
reserve levels for bad debts that exceed statutory requirements but do not 
exceed the limits stipulated by fiscal authorities. This would cause line A to 
shift inward becoming line A ' and line B to shift upward forming line B ' 
diminishing the influence of the marginal tax rate upon the bank's posttax 
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market value. In essence the posttax market value of the bank will increase 
as a result of the more generous reserve policy.30 
The other form of a potentially costless hedge would be a manager's 
overall economic incentives to undertake risk. In a bank the maximum value 
at risk for shareholders is the paid-in capital. A bank can reduce its risk 
imposed on other claimholders by hedging. This suggests that if the reduction 
in the compensation of managers, employees, and other suppliers plus the 
increased revenues from customers exceeds the costs of hedging, hedging 
increases the value of the firm. 
If the manager's compensation is a function of the bank's market value, 
the manager's expected utility will be to increase the bank's value. However, 
given the nature and structure of the incentive, a bank hedging policy may be 
affected. For example, if the manager's utility is a convex function of the 
bank's market value, the manager has a higher expected value of the bank if 
it is not hedged at all. Bonus or stock options provisions can make a manager's 
utility function convex, where more is always better, making the manager a 
risk seeker. 
If the manager's utility function is a concave function , then the 
manager's optimal hedging for the bank will be to hedge completely. The 
30The regulatory authorities, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the F'DIC a re more 
roncerned with the solvency of commercial banks and, as a result, would prefer generous reserve 
levels. The fiscal or tax authority, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), is more concerned with 
the bank paying the highest level of taxes in the aggregate and keeping the reserve levels as fine 
t uned as possible. 
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expected income of the manager is maximized if the firm is completely hedged. 
So, since the manager is risk averse, he will choose to bear risk only if he is 
rewarded by doing so with higher income. Since his expected income is 
maximized when the firm is completely hedged, the manager will choose to 
bear no risk. This suggests that the manager's compensation is high in current 
terms and has an incentive to undertake a costless hedge by not undertaking 
new projects. This type of manager will also attempt to harvest existing 
profitable ventures and cut overhead expenditures to increase the bank's 
market value. 
B. Bank Hedging Policy in Imperfect 
and Incomplete Markets 
The previous section outlined a theory of hedging limited to market 
failures caused by a government's tax regime, contracting costs, and 
managerial incentives.31 
The "incomplete" and "imperfect'' nature of markets for U.S. commercial 
banks relates to the extent that they undertake exposure to interest rates. 
Interest rate exposure is the uncertainty introduced into a bank's earnings by 
possible changes in interest rates (Stigum and Branch 1985). This definition 
expands the possible list of market failures where a bank may have an 
31 The issue of co ntracting costs is of little interest to our research because it has bee n 
extensively stuctied by others. The research has generally focused on the implications of FDI C 
insura nce on bank behavior and profitability as opposed to financial innovations per se. 
49 
incentive to undertake a hedge outlined initially by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). 
The inherent nature of commercial banks is to accept some degree of 
interest rate exposure. Banks in the 1980s consciously adjusted the structure 
of their balance sheets to increase their interest rate exposure in an attempt 
to earn profits higher than those that would accrue from operating as a broker. 
For the larger U.S. banks, lending rates are low relative to their cost of 
funds, making the spreads they earn on brokering small. In order for 
commercial lending to be profitable, many U.S. banks have had to assume 
additional interest rate exposure. For example, in an environment where the 
interest rate yield curve is positively sloped, banks are often tempted to lend 
long term and take short-term deposits in order to improve lending margins 
and act as an intermediary as opposed to a broker. 
The logical solution would be to match assets and liabilities and simply 
act as a broker. However, empirical research indicates that spreads on 
brokering tend to vary inversely with the size of the bank. In other words, the 
larger the bank, the smaller the average lending spread (Kalchbrenner 1985). 
This suggests that in order to maximize profits, the typical large 
commercial bank must have an asset and liability mismatch or "gap" that 
would look like figure 5 and behave as an intermediary (Stigum and Branch 
1985). 
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The level of interest rate exposure and the fluctuating value of its 
capital are the principal risks that bankers are required to hedgea2 The 
market risk measures of banks are considered in equation (3) as a function of 
interest rate exposure, financial leverage and the variability of bank profits. 
Market Risk Measures = f(GAP , LEV, VAR) . (3) 
In the 1980s, the high and volatile nominal interest rates associated with 
contemporary inflation prompted a pronounced change in commercial bank 
b' I I I " ., 
'· 
.' 
' 
l 
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!II Liabilities D Assets 
FIG . 5.-Hypothetical worldwide interest rate exposure of a money 
center bank (percent). 
32 0 ther market measures are considered in the economic literature but arc not 
considered within the context of fin a ncial innovation. F'or example, Liang and Rhoades (199 1) , 
Hassa n (1 992), a nd Blanco and Pawson (forthco ming) researched the importance of prude nt 
asset divers ification , adequate capital, securitization of certain loan assets, and a balanced 
fin ancial leverage. However, Kau fma n ( 1994) suggested that these issues a re t he outcomes of 
poo r interest rate management policies by commcrctal banks. 
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balance sheets. In the absence of low-cost deposits, banks have had to pursue 
high and increasingly more expensive funding sources. As a result, banks 
have foregone fixed rate loans in favor of variable rate loans to better match 
assets and liabilities. 
If a bank decides to undertake loans that are not "matched" and not act 
merely as a broker to intermediate between depositors and borrowers, then a 
mismatch will exist between the duration of the assets and liabilities. The 
bank in this case transforms the asset by modifying the attributes of the 
financial claims (duration, divisibility, etc.) and through financial innovations 
(derivatives or securitization) hedge away as much of the interest rate 
exposure as possible (Deshmukh, Greenbaum, and Kanatas 1983). 
The greater the level of the gap or mismatch, the greater the risk the 
bank has assumed. To study this phenomenon one should consider an 
environment whereby the demand for loans is perfectly elastic at an uncertain 
rate of interest r d and a supply of funds that is also elastic and whose interest 
rate is also unknown at r,. The bank is subject to a funding constraint of its 
own arising from a statutory capital requirement, L . The bank will borrow 
some amount to fund its loan demand L0 , where L0 s L always, at some known 
funding rate r, *. The variable L0 represents the bet that a bank is willing to 
take on interest rates where r d > r, *and r, * :? r,. Since the underlying risk is 
obtaining a cost of funding above the prevailing rate of interest borrowers are 
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willing to pay for a loan, the bank's exposure is the initial level of funding, L 0 . 
The risk-seeking bank would borrow L0 = L.33 The expected profits of a bank 
that decides to operate a mismatched loan portfolio is reflected below in 
equation (4) where E(•) is the expectation operator. 
rt(L0 ) = E(rd)L0 + (L - L 0 )E(Max(rd- r,, O))-r, *L0 ,L0 ~ L (4) 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (4) is the expected 
interest revenue from actual lending. The second term represents the expected 
interest revenue based on the unutilized lending capacity. This second term 
will become zero because a bank that operates a mismatched loan portfolio 
intends to maximize profits and would leave no unused capacity. The third 
term is the known cost of borrowing L0 in advance. 
As the level of uncertainty of rd increases, banks will have a greater 
tendency to operate as brokers with a matched loan portfolio as opposed to 
running a mismatched loan book to attempt to increase their gross lending 
spread. The increased uncertainty of rd will lower the probability of banks 
making the right "bet" on interest rates, decreasing the likelihood of an 
attractive return. 
An increase in the absolute level of r d relative to r, will generally leave 
the spread the same or greater as interest rates increase. This suggests that 
higher and more volatile interest rates influence bank hedging behavior in 
33The ba nk that acts as a broker would bo L0 = 0. 
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opposing directions. Higher loan rates provide incentives for banks to operate 
a mismatch in their loan portfolios while interest rate volatility will drive 
banks to match assets and liabilities and act as brokers. 
The same concept holds for r,, which remains unknown, even if rd is 
known , the bank's expected profit, equation (4), will yield the same result. 
Banks will lend as much possible, since L0 = L holds, so they will continue to 
mismatch assets and liabilities if a mean-preserving spread- shown in 
equation (5)- is maintained. 
E(rd) - r,• 2 E[Max(rd - r,, 0)] (5) 
The left-hand side of equation (5) represents the forecasted lending 
spread the bank perceives it can obtain, given its expectation of future interest 
rates, loan demand, and its actual cost of funding. This becomes the mean 
preserving spread for banks that operate as an intermediary running a 
mismatched loan portfolio. 
The right-hand side of the equation is the mean preserving spread 
where the bank acts merely as a broker. 
So as the volatility of r, increases, the probability of higher and lower 
values increases as well. The broker's expected marginal profit will be higher, 
since it will never make a loan with a negative spread where r d < r , and the 
possibility of a lower r, makes the spread potentially higher. The left-hand 
side of equation (5) will remain unchanged under this scenario. The overall 
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impact will be for banks to increasingly behave as brokers as the volatility of 
r, increases. 
A secondary effect would be an increased allocation of bank assets 
towards securities away from loans as banks regularly reinvest the loan 
repayments they receive (Keeton 1994). Table 9 shows what portion of the 
reallocation process to more securities and less loans is attributable to an 
increased level of volatility in interest rates. 
According to Keeton (1994), having an understanding of what particular 
shock s have influenced past changes in bank security holdings will suggest 
how plausible it is that the same kind of shock can explain the recent ch ange. 
TABLE 9 
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION FOR RATIO OF SECUR ITIES TO POTENTIAL 
GDP, 1960-90 
Category 
Fed Funds rate 
GDP 
Inflation 
Loans 
Core deposits 
Large time deposits 
Securities 
Total 
SOU RC'E: Keeton 1994. 
Percentage of Variance Over 
3.5-Year Period 
10 
19 
27 
24 
2 
5 
_13. 
100 
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The first row of table 9 illustrates that over a 3.5-year period, 10 percent of the 
variation of the security ratio from the level expected at the beginning of the 
period tended to be due to unexpected changes in the Fed Funds rate. The 
three macroeconomic variables and loans account for much of the past 
variation in the security ratio. After a period of 3.5 years, shocks to these four 
variables tend to explain 80 percent of the variation from the level initially 
expected in the security ratio. 
These results are consistent with economic theory and empirical 
research, which assert that interest rate volatility due to changes in the Fed 
Funds rate, fluctuating inflation levels, etc. , increase risk levels forcing banks 
to undertake corresponding hedges. The Keeton (1994) article highlights one 
such hedge- the reallocation of assets away from loans to securities. 
C. Some Applications of Bank Hedging 
Strategies and Financial Innovation 
Banks in the previous two sections were limited to hedging-increased 
risk attributable to a progressive tax regime, perverse managerial compensa-
tion incentives, and the volatility of the demand and supply price of credit. 
The proposed theory has limited bank hedging policy to strategic actions of 
foregoing or limiting certain business activities (i.e ., changing management's 
compensation incentives, stopping or operating a mismatched loan portfolio) . 
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This section explores some of the diagnostic tools and remedies that 
financial innovation has afforded banks in addressing the issue of interest rate 
risk. The financial innovations utilized by banks fall under the rubric of 
interest rate management. Interest rate management within a bank attempts 
to evaluate the magnitude of the institution's risk concerning the duration of 
assets and liabilities and to implement solutions that cover any imbalance that 
may exist. These solutions assist bankers to mitigate and possibly avoid losses 
in the event of a volatile or rising interest rate climate, which historically has 
impacted U.S. banks negatively. 
The four innovations selected for this section include interest rate 
swaps, futures, options, and securitization. Each has played an important role 
in the interest rate management process. 
Other financial innovations like currency-related derivative products 
and other off-balance activities (i.e., letters of credit, securities underwriting, 
etc.), which have played a relevant though smaller role, are not discussed. 
Interest rate exposure for banks highlighted in the previous section is 
manifested when interest rates increase, causing banks to realize market 
losses if unhedged. The nature of the new financial innovation is to create an 
asset that moves in the opposite direction of, say bond prices, when interest 
rates increase. The ideal structure of a financial innovation, like derivatives, 
will covary in exactly the same magnitude in opposite directions. So, if bond 
prices were to drop 2 percent, the value of the ideal interest rate future or 
option would increase 2 percent, providing a perfect hedge. 
D. Duration Analysis and Bank 
Hedging Policy 
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Duration is an important diagnostic tool utilized by banks to evaluate 
the average of assets and liabilites. It is a more precise measure of the life of 
assets , bond and loans, liabilities, deposits, and borrowings than maturity, 
because it takes into consideration any cash flows that are received. The 
larger the cash flow, the lower the duration, or interest rate risk, of the bond. 
Specifically, duration is calculated as the weighted average time to 
maturity of a bond, using the relative present values of the cash flows as 
weights. The calculation yields a single number called Macauley's duration 
that is expressed in units of time, which corresponds to the receipt of cash 
flows. Macauley's duration essentially represents the present value of the cash 
flow payments over time. 
Consider again the example of bank A It owns a 10-year bond with a 
6 percent annual coupon. The bank has taken $100 in 10-year deposits at 4 
percent. Interest is due and payable at maturity, a zero coupon type 
arrangement. 
The bank appears to be matched with a 2 percent gross spread margin. 
However, the average duration of the bond is 7.62 years versus the 10-year 
duration of the deposit being 10 years. There is a mismatch. 
Those duration figures were substituted for equation (6) to calculate the 
modified duration. Modified duration predicts the sensitivity of a bond or bank 
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deposits to increases in interest rates. Assume bond and bank deposit rates 
of interest increase to 7 and 5 percent, respectively. 
The basic formula for modified duration is, D equals the Macauley 
duration figure and r is the current market rate of interest where using the 
scenario above, the Dm for the 
D (6) 
( 1 + r) 
bond is 7.12, suggesting that the bond price will decline by 6.54 percent to 
$93.46. The Dm for the bank deposit is 9.52, suggesting that the market value 
of the bank deposit will drop 4. 76 percent to $95.24. 
The difference between assets and liabilities equals $95.24 - $93.46 = 
$1. 78. It represents a capital deficiency between assets and liabilities that 
must be covered by applying some of the bank's uncommitted tier I capital. A 
more efficient mechanism for bank A would have been to hedge this exposure 
beforehand in the financial futures and options and avoid fluctuations in its 
capital base. 
The risk exposure of bank A in our scenario is an asset/liability 
mismatch of 7.62 to 10 years, outlined previously, and a disproportional level 
of sensitivity towards interest rates. With the current composition of assets 
and liabilities, bank A will generate a $1 .78 capital deficiency for every $100 
in assets for every 1 percent increase in interest rates if unhedged. 
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E. Bank Hedging Instruments 
1. Interest Rate Swaps 
Most of the research literature cites the benefits of swaps as an interest 
rate risk management tool (Wall and Pringle 1990; Smith, Smithson, and 
Wakemann 1986). Aspinwall (1982) suggests three kinds of general responses 
to undesired interest rate exposure: widen the spread between revenue and 
cost, restructure the balance sheet, or use derivative market contracts. A 
wider spread offers a cushion for a bank to absorb interest rate risk. Widening 
the spread may not be a viable long-run alternative because customers may be 
lost in competitive loan and deposit markets. 
The restructuring of asset or liability accounts to achieve the desired 
relationship between interest rate reset dates may also be an imperfect 
alternative for managing interest rate risk. Variable-rate instead of fixed-rate 
lending may transform interest rate risk into credit risk for the bank. 
Customers also may have the same view as the bank on the direction of future 
interest rates. Balance sheet restructuring may lead to increased costs or 
decreased costs or decreased revenues because banks may have to offer 
premium rates on deposits or discounts on loans to attract customers to its 
desired deposit or loan product characteristics. The bank can solve the 
problem of customer resistence by converting the fixed-rate deposits desired 
by customers expecting a decline in rates into a floating rate cash flow through 
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an interest rate swap. The bank can then take advantage of falling rates and 
yet still be able to meet its customers' needs by issuing long-term deposits and 
offering variable-rate loans. 
It is also argued that interest rate swaps are cheaper and more flexible 
than restructuring existing liabilities. Using domestic bond markets to reissue 
debt is costly because a credit rating from a rating agency is often required, 
and other costs such as advertising, legal fees, and an underwriter spread 
make it an expensive proposition (Loeys 1985). Wall and Pringle (1990) also 
argue that interest rate swaps provide a low-cost method of making immediate 
changes in a firm's exposure to market interest rates and are more flexible 
than exchange-traded futures and options. Interest rate swaps can provide 
interest rate risk management benefits to swapping parties without depending 
on the existence of a quality spread differential. 
The level of interest rate swaps is a function of the duration mismatch 
and quality differential between counterparties and the anticipated covariance 
between assets and liabilities in the future. Equation (7) illustrates this 
relationship: 
(7) 
where S,, is level of interest rate swaps; qJ is interest rate quality differential 
between counterparties; Dmis is mismatch in the duration between asset and 
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liabilites; E(Cov AL) is expected covariance between the duration of future 
assets and liabilities. 
Consider bank C with a hypothetical $100 loan portfolio that yields the 
prime rate of interest plus 50 basis points, a floating rate of interest, financed 
by $100 of 10-year bonds at 10 percent; while bank D has a hypothetical $100 
loan portfolio in fixed-rate mortgages financed with short-term bank deposits. 
Both banks are motivated to hedge their interest rate exposure because of the 
obvious asset and liability mismatch . 
The swap may be constructed in the following fashion. Bank D agrees to 
pay bank C a fixed rate of 10 percent per year on $100 for 10 years supported 
by its fixed-rate mortgage portfolio. Bank C will pay bank D the prime rate of 
interest plus 50 basis points based on its variable or floating rate loan portfolio. 
Though our example illustrates a scenario with no quality differential , 
there exist many other situations where one of the counterparties may not need 
to hedge but rather is making a market for smaller financial institutions. The 
incentive for the market-making bank is to capture the quality differential and 
assist the smaller financial institution to hedge its risk. 
This product development element of the interest rate swap market is 
relevant but controlled by a small number of commercial banks in the United 
States. The top five banks control about 80 percent of the interest rate swap 
volume. Most other U.S. banks undertake an interest swap to hedge interest 
rate risk on their balance sheets. 
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2. Interest Rate Futures and Option 
The concept of interest rate futures and options is to mark up the 
underlying spot price of an asset by the estimated appreciation- at least the 
rate of interest- plus custodial and administrative fees to hold the asset. 
Equation (8) represents the hypothetical future price for any asset: 
(8) 
where F0 is current future price; P, is current spot price; i0 is current market 
rate of interest; and C1 is custodial and adminsitrative fees. 
Equation (8) shows that future value will move inversely to the value of 
the fixed income security. In the event of an increase in i0, the value of a bond, 
or any other fixed rate security, will cause bond prices to drop . However, the 
futures price will move inversely since an increase in i0 will increase the value 
of the right-hand side of equation (8), hence, the value of F0. 
A more rigorous approach is also considered. Let P0 be the initial price 
of a bond (i.e. , $100) and P1 equals the future value of the sanoe asset, which is 
uncertain. Let Pt be the mean of P1, and &P denotes the standard deviation of 
Pt - P0 . 
The variables F0 and F 1 refer to the initial and ending futures prices, 
with F 1"' being the mean value of F 1, and &P denoting the standard deviation of 
the futures price change. The hedge will consist of a short position in h units 
of futures for every unit of the cash position. The correlation between the 
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current price, or cash, position and the futures price is p. The gain per unit on 
the portfolio is the price change on the cash position minus h times the change 
in the futures price. 
Gain (P1rn - P0) - h(F1rn - F0) . (9) 
The expected gain is then: 
expected gain = (P1 - P0 ) - h(F1 - F0 ) , (10) 
where h* would be the optimal hedge and is expressed as pO/Or, where h* is the 
covariance between the price change of the current or cash price and the price 
change of the futures contract, divided by the variance of the price change of the 
futures contract. Unless p = 1 or -1, there will be some residual risk or some 
unhedged portion of the original cash position (Figlewski 1986). 
Consider a hypothetical example where bank A holds an asset with a 
nominal value of$100 with a nominal rate of interest of 7 percent and a 10-year 
maturity. It desires to hedge the asset's return and conserve its lending spread 
over its cost of funds. Bank B also holds a $100 asset at 7 percent, would like 
to increase the marginal return of its portfolio, and is prepared to write an 
interest rate option on its asset. 
So bank B writes an option on its asset for 25 cents for 360 days at 
current levels. Bank A decides to acquire the option and pays 25 cents to bank 
B for an interest rate option of 7 percent on a $100 asset with a 10-year 
maturity. Bank A has purchased insurance for itself against future fluctuations 
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in interest rates. Bank B has successfully increased its marginal return but has 
accepted additional risk. 
If interest rates remain unchanged or decreased over the 360-day period, 
bank A would not exercise the option and obtain a net yield of 6. 75 percent 
while bank B would have yielded 7.25 percent.34 
In the event interest rates increase to 7.50 percent, the underlying value 
of the asset will decrease to $96.75, increasing the value of the option 
progressively to $3.25 on the 359th day. Bank A could sell its option and 
recover its losses or force bank B to deliver $100 to bank A on the 360th day. 
Bank B would realize a net loss of $3.00 (25 cents- $3.25 = -$3.00) (Solomon, 
Marshall, and Pepper 1983). 
The most efficient mechanism for Bank A would have been to sell the 
option just prior to the expiration date to avoid the transaction costs of selling 
the underlying asset. 
3. Asset Securitization 
The level oflending was traditionally a function of the rate of interest and 
the expected return that banks hoped to obtain (Stiglitz and Weiss 1971). The 
securitization market has transformed traditional lending practices to be a 
34The value of the option would have dropped substantially if interest rates dropped, 
making it a perfunctory exercise. For example, if the market rate of interest drops from 7 
percent to 6 percent, the market value of the asset would increase to $107.50. The value of the 
option would move in the opposite direction and would eve ntually equal zero on the expiration 
date or 360 th day. 
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function of the amount banks expect to make by originating and servicing 
securitized loans and the risk premium that investors can obtain versus other 
fixed income vehicles. 
Securitization impacts the level of a bank's interest rate exposure by 
removing from a bank's balance sheet those assets that remain unhedged, and 
improves the bank's return on assets at the margin. 
The outstanding balance of a bank's securitized asset pool is a function 
of the prevailing rate of interest, r, and future expectations of borrowers and 
investors considering the state of world, n: Traditionally, as r falls, a certain 
percentage of borrowers will prepay their mortgage and refinance at the lower 
rate of interest, causing the outstanding balance of securitized assets to fall. 
The parameter n increases as the level of uncertainty among borrowers and 
investors increases. For example, if many borrowers have been on the sidelines 
watching interest rates drop and believe that interest rates will increase in the 
near future, the rate of prepayment will increase. 
In the case of the investor, the level of uncertainty could increase if the 
perceived credit quality of the underlying borrowers were to change. 
Equation (10) represents the level of oustanding securitized assets based 
on the current change in interest rates and the perception of the state of the 
world by borrowers and investors: 
x· = x~ ' Ar>" X>O (10) 
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where X" is the current value of the outstanding securitized asset pool; X0 is the 
original level of securitized assets; !:J.r is the change in interest rates; and n is 
the perception of the state of the world by borrowers and investors. 
Assuming X0 equals 10, the outstanding balance of securitized assets 
based on different values for !:J.r and n is shown in table 10, where Llr < 1 and 
n>O. 
The management of a portfolio of securitzed assets directly affects the 
profitability of a bank. The underlying profit function of a bank changes if it 
decides to securitize a portion of its loan portfolio. The new function modifies 
equation (4) by incorporating the impact of equation (10): 
where P represents the margin that banks obtain to administer the securitized 
asset pool on behalf of investors. 
TABLE 10 
EVOLUTION OF THE O UTSTANDING BALANCE OF SECURITIZED AsSETS 
!:J.r/ n 
-.01 
-.03 
-.05 
9.7723 
9.3325 
8.9125 
2 
9.552 
8.720 
7.989 
3 
9.3387 
8.178 
7.200 
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The second term on the right-hand side of equation (11) represents the 
marginal contribution that securitization represents to earnings. The marginal 
increase in the bank's return on equity (ROE) is represented by equation (12): 
~ROE = P·X' 
K ' 
where K represents the bank's shareholder equity. 
(12) 
CHAPTERV 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL 
INNOVATION UPON U.S. BANK PROFITABILITY 
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This chapter attempts to evaluate the implications of financial 
innovations, namely off-balance sheet transactions (OBS), upon the return on 
equity (ROE), and return on assets (ROA) of U.S. banks. The research 
literature has discovered that the adoption pattern of financial innovations 
within banks has followed a logistic time curve (Davies 1979). The basic model, 
developed by Davies and later enhanced by Jagtiani, Saunders, and Udell 
(1995), states that the principal OBS financial innovations (FIOBS), namely 
interest rate swaps, interest rate futures and options, and asset securitization, 
as compared to traditional OBS activities like standby letters of credit, are 
expected to grow over time as OBS financial technology is diffused among banks 
as a function of capital. 
The speed of adoption by financial institutions could only be conditional 
upon capital adequacy and requirements if capital shortage was an 
industrywide problem. Also, FIOBS, like interest rate swaps, interest rate 
futures and options, etc. , require well-capitalized institutions and are not for 
those that are attempting to make up for capital shortfalls by diversifying into 
OBS activities. In particular, the likelihood and extent of swap market 
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participation by undercapitalized banks have been found to be less than for the 
well-capitalized banks (Kim and Koppenhaver 1992). 
One can examine various profitability measures (nJ and financial 
innovation parameters in determining the implications of OBS growth. These 
profitability measures include ROE and ROA. The general form of the model 
evaluates the direct influence of FIOBS activities, or financial innovation 
parameters, on each profitability measure. It can be asserted that the changing 
nature of the banking industry in the 1980s induced these institutions to 
undertake more OBS activities- not because of more rigorous capital 
requirements but because of pressure to improve the level of the institution's 
financial performance and limit the variability of earnings to increase the 
banks' posttax value. 
A. Data Set 
The data utilized were obtained from the FDIC call reports for 1990 
through 1994 for all U.S commercial banks with total assets of $1 billion or 
more. The number of banks ranged from 245 to 264 per year. The data set was 
adjusted to eliminate all foreign bank branches that are not statutorily required 
to report all ledger items to U.S. authorities. The remaining banks reporting 
ranged from 135 to 163 annually during the specified period. 
Forty-three to 70 banks, depending on the year, did not report a full five 
years of data for the following reason(s): (1) the bank had not reached $1 billion 
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in assets until after 1990, (2) the bank fell below $1 billion in assets during any 
of the five years, or (3) the bank was acquired, merged, or sold a significant 
portion of its assets to another bank. Banks that exhibited one or more of these 
problems were eliminated from the sample to facilitate constructing a complete 
cross-sectional time series for the reporting banks. 
The data were transformed into ratios to avoid any scale effects that may 
be generated in the results. 
Figure 6 indicates the evolution of the level (ROA) and variance 
(V ARROA) of earnings with respect to assets. A similar relationship exists for 
the level of ROE and variance (V ARROE) of earnings with respect to 
shareholder equity or capital. 
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Figure 7 illustrates the level of financial innovation (DERIVA) as a 
percentage of assets. DERIVA is equal to the sum of the notional principal for 
all interest rate swaps, interest rate futures and options, and securitized assets 
(Federal Housing Association, Farmer MAC, and private) divided by total 
assets. The increased utilization of financial innovation demonstrates the 
growing acceptance by U.S. banks to incorporate financial derivatives as a part 
of its funding and interest rate management strategy. This increased usage, 
according to some, has increased the riskiness of banks and fragility of the 
financial system (Niggle 1986). 
Table 11 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for the key 
variables utilized in analyzing the effects of FIOBS utilization across U.S. 
banks. 
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TABLE 11 
D ESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES 
St is , 
Variabl e Mea n Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
L Profitability measures 
ROE 0.140727 0. 186294 4.26466 ·2.3789 1 0.299525 
ROA 0.010597 0.012898 0.057154 -0.08251 I 0.013557 
I L Ri s k measures 
VARROE 0.08960 0.009187 17.0128 L27E-05 0.706286 
VARROA 0.000189 3.66£-05 0.009099 L73E- 10 0.0000189 
Ill. Operating variables 
PREM 0.011036 0.00056 3.02449 3.97E-10 0. 136712 
DEP 1.08967 0.803971 22.3406 -0.003178 1.299565 
ORISK 7.6109 0.04760 I 2288.63 ·2792.95 157. 748 
NONTRAD 2.762 10 2. 6630 16.7534 -130.657 6 .5277 
MARGIN 0.090197 0.083407 0.294119 0.009962 0.032365 
LOSSRAT 0.008905 0.006188 0.078217 0.00 0.009272 
LIQUID 0.070925 0.056223 0.348661 0.00 0.062047 
EXPN 0.064309 0.061680 0. 159970 0 .010195 0.018904 
IV. Financial innovation varia bles 
DERIVA 0.64882 0. 161 584 16.26883 0.00 1.69573 
DERIVE 10.3072 2.37734 308.0006 0.00 5.609 17 
SWA 0.83494 0. 176004 24 .0775 0.00 2. 15650 
SWE 5.5527 1.66631 162.8406 0.00 15. 1665 
FUTOPT 0.292524 0.017797 9.4 239 0.00 0.918835 
FUTOPTE 4.70934 0.253716 163 .38 12 0.00 16.00945 
SECRAT 0.002732 0.00 0. 135 149 0.00 0.01077 
SECE 0.045114 0.00 2.640308 0.00 . 18586 1 
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Table 11 is divided into four segments- profitability measures, risk 
measures, operating variables, and financial innovation variables. Parts III and 
IV are the principal explanatory variables used to analyze the strategic usage 
of financial derivatives among U.S. banks. 
The variable MARGIN represents total interest income minus total 
interest expense divided by total assets. Generally, the bigger the lending 
margin (the spread over the cost offunds), the greater the level of profitability 
for banks. The bank's overhead expenditures are represented by EXPN, which 
is the sum of salaries and benefits, cost of premises and equipment, and 
noninterest income divided by total assets. This variable is a measure of a 
bank's budgetary discipline concerning its operating expenditures. The more 
inexpensive a bank's operating structure as a percentage of assets , the higher 
the level of profitability. 
The risk preferences of banks are evaluated by the variables DEP and 
PREM. The variable DEP is the level of interest paid on all deposits , including 
certificates of deposits greater than $100,000 , divided by total liabilities. This 
measures the dependency of banks on deposited funds relative to other bank 
funding sources. The variable PREM is the variance of the interest paid on 
certificates of deposits greater than $100,000 relative to total liabilities. This 
variable indicates the volatility of the premium that banks must pay for funds . 
This is considered to be a true indicator of the market premium that a bank 
74 
must pay to capture third-party deposits and a good proxy for measuring a 
bank's solvency or credit rating. As PREM decreases, the ROE of banks is 
expected to increase. 
The variable ORISK is the variance of operating expenses relative to 
operating income. The risk of insolvency or the revision of a bank's credit rating 
is directly related to the possibility of operating expenses exceeding operating 
income. Section C of this chapter highlights the inverse relationship between 
operating expense and profitability. An increase in the variance of a bank's 
operating expenses may contribute to increased variance of earnings. 
The variable entitled NONTRAD represents the sum of all real estate 
loans, foreign loans, and fixed assets, including premises relative to total assets. 
Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (1996) learned that a change in the asset 
composition of U.S. S&Ls towards more traditional assets can influence 
profitability. A positive relationship between nontraditional assets and 
variability of profits would suggest that banks may have increased the value of 
the FDIC subsidy and the bank's posttax value at the expense of more risk in 
the form of greater volatility in earnings. 
The level of a bank's liquidity highlights its ability to borrow and sell 
assets that have a ready market value without incurring substantial losses. The 
variable UQUID is the best indicator of this phenomenon and assesses a bank's 
available resources to meet short-run cash outflows or to use them as ready 
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collateral for borrowing funds. It has been assumed that bank liquidity has a 
positive relationship with the variability of profitability. 
The variable LOSSRAT is the sum of loans 90 days past due and 
nonaccruals with respect to assets. According to Berger, King, and O'Brien 
(1991), the level of loan losses to assets is an indicator of a bank's risk 
preference and is assumed to have a positive relationship with respect to the 
variability of bank earnings. 
The influence of financial innovation variables is represented by 
DERIV A(E), which is the sum of the notional principal amount of interest rate 
swaps, the volume of interest rate futures and options, and the outstanding 
balance of all securitized assets relative to total assets or shareholder's equity 
or capital. The growth in the level of derivatives by bank imposes a direct 
expense to operations in order to hedge but can be welfare-increasing for banks 
that may be risk-seeking. The introduction of this variable is an extension of 
Berger's (1995) model and allows one to evaluate the contribution of financial 
innovations to bank profitability at the margin. 
The next three variables represent the influence of specific classes of 
financial innovation with respect to total assets. The variable SWA(E) is the 
notional principal value of interest rate swaps with respect to assets and capital. 
While FUTOPT(E) is the sum of the volume of interest rate futures and options 
with respect to assets and capital, the SWA and FUTOPT are consistent with 
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th e model specification used in Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (1996). The final 
variables, often overlooked SECRAT and SECE, are the sum of all securitized 
asse ts as a percentage of assets. Blanco and Fawson (1995) highlight the 
welfare gains to banks, which can securitize assets, permitting profitability to 
improve at the margin. All financial innovation variables are expected to h ave 
a negative or inverse relationship with the variability of ROE and ROA. 
B. Methodology 
The empirical analysis of the profitability measures utilize three forms 
of regression analysis. The first form of analysis is entitled "Pool," which 
stacked the data by year for all banks. Dummy variables were introduced to 
accou nt for the time-series nature of the data and correct for autocorrelation. 
The regression error in such a model, for GLS as well, is composed of a time and 
cro s-sectional component. The estimators are based on a covariance 
transformation and generally are more efficient for known variance components 
for finite samples (Wallace and Hussain 1969). 
The use of dummy variables would force no restrictions on the pattern of 
hi.fting regression intercepts, while the error component model would presume 
that th e pattern follows a norm al distribution. Specifically, assume that the 
cross-section intercept has a mean of au and a variance of o2u. The combined 
error component has a mean of 0 and a variance of o2"'. These two assumptions 
are equivalent to the assumption that the error component has a variance of 
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o2" + o2 w • The effect of the mean of the normally distributed intercepts (av) 
with variance (a2) will be accounted for by the inclusion of a constant term (p0) 
in the pooled regression equation (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991). 
Y, = Po + L a,D, + L P1~ + E, (13) 
where Po is the constant term; a, is the time coefficient on the ith bank; Pi is the 
jth parameter of the ith bank; D, is the time dummy; and E, is the error term at 
timet. 
The error would then include three components and would have variance: 
Var(e ,,) =a: + a~ + o~ (14) 
The second form is generalized least squares (GLS) with fixed effects, 
which is used when the data exhibit autocorrelation and the true value of o2 is 
unknown . The fixed effects model assumes that the parameter values shift in 
the same way across all banks. The model is useful in detecting which banks 
may yield significant statistical results individually (Greene 1993). The GLS 
regression utilized the variance of the residual values as the cross-sectional 
weight on the time series. Again, the results exhibit a reduction in the degrees 
of freedom due to missing observations for certain banks (Gujarti 1992; 
Griffiths, Hill, and Judge 1993). 
Y, = ta, + X, P + e, (15) 
Let Y, and X, be the T observations for the ith bank, and let E, be the 
associated T x 1 vector of disturbances. The values of the coefficients and test 
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statistics (in parentheses) for the dummy variable of each individual bank are 
reported in appendix B. 
The third form of regression analysis utilized used a GLS random effects 
model to relax the assumption that all banks are not systematically correlated 
and whose operating and financial innovation parameters may shift to varying 
degrees. The random effects view individual specific constant terms as randomly 
distributed across banks. This is considered appropriate if one believes that the 
strategic behaviors of U.S. banks are unrelated to each other. For example, 
macroeconomic factors are assumed to affect banks randomly and not in a 
common systematic manner. The underlying regression model is outlined in 
equation (16). 
(16) 
where the component u, is the random disturbance characterizing the ith 
observation and is constant through time. In the analysis of the various banks, 
it represents the collection offactors not in the regression that is specific to each 
bank. 
The White test was utilized to evaluate the existence ofheteroscedasticity 
in the data for all models. Once the data were transformed from the levels to 
ratios, no heteroscedasticity was found. The White test is based on the 
comparison of the sample variance of least-squares estimators under 
homoscedasticity and under heteroscedasticity. The test involves applying the 
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least-squares method and calculating the coefficient of determination called: 
nR2 w· The underlying null hypothesis is expressed in equation (17), where n is 
the number of observations 
(17) 
The test results failed to reject the null hypothesis ofhomoscedasticity for 
all models (Kmenta 1986). 
A test for endogeneity was conducted between the level of financial 
innovation and the variability of the profitability measures and tested 
statistically insignificant. 
C. Impact of Financial innovation on 
Bank Profitability 
The profitability measures in our model are the endogenous variables. 
The exogenous variables capture bank revenue, expense, risk preference, and 
financial innovation. By examining the variation of the selected exogenous 
variables in the model against the profitability measures, one can study the 
observed behavior of the banks (Berger 1995). The model is specified as follows : 
1t = (Margin , Expn , Deriva , Dep, Prem) . (18) 
The coefficients for each parameter reflect the rate of change of the 
profitability measure relative to the key operating variables and the aggregate 
or individual level of financial innovation(s) (interest rate swaps, etc.) across 
banks. 
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The signs of the coefficient are illustrated below, suggesting that U.S. 
banks, like manufacturers, have strong incentives to innovate to achieve 
economies of scope. Economies of scope in banking are achieved if a bank 
becomes more profitable or efficient to produce more products or services 
without changing the capital base. 
a ll > 0 ~ < 0 a ll ~ o, ~ " o, a ll , 0 . 
aMargin ' a Expn ' a Deriva(e) a Dep a Prem 
The regression results are shown in tables 12 and 13. 
In table 12, the results indicate that MARGIN is significant at the 1 
percent level, depending on the functional form of the regression model. The 
"pool" and "GIS" results suggest that lending margins or spreads are strongly 
correlated among banks. 
The EXPN variable is significant at the 1 percent level for all regression 
forms with the appropriate negative sign. This suggests that there is a strong 
s tatistical relationship between the cost of a bank's operating structure in the 
U.S . and ROA. The seemingly unrelated effect of operating costs on assets is 
rejected and supports the idea that bankers select products that are cost 
efficient to administer. This furthers the notion that banks have incentives to 
adopt process innovations (ATMs, automated money transfer systems, etc.) that 
reduce the cost per transaction and improve profitability at the margin . 
The variable entitled DERIVA in our model is the proxy for financial 
innovation. The variable tests insignificant statistically for the "pool" and "pool 
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TABLE 12 
INFLUENCE OF FIOBS ACTIVITIES ON BANK ROA 
A 
Independent Variable (Pool) (GLS Fixed) (GLS Random) 
Constant 0.02193 0.03174 0.03399 
(11.8043) (362.167) (15.35789) 
Margin 0.019988 0.06789 0.06573 
(5.5631) (15.1817) (3.51962) 
Expn -0.2281 -0.3493 -0.387177 
(-7.9509) (-130.803) (-11.4467) 
Deriva -0 .00024 -4.72E-11 3.77E-12 
(-0.9688) (-12.1348) (0.14741) 
D(1) -0.01532 
(-9.3986) 
D(2) -0.01143 
(-7.6539) 
D(3) -0.00345 
(-2 .5012) 
D(4) -0.000536 
(-0.39198) 
R2 0.2551 0.998 0.6697 
F -Statistic 37.4814 105797.9 
N 774 465 465 
Durbin-Watson 1.714 1.4256 2.17278 
NOTE: t -s tatistics are shown in parentheses. 
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TABLE 13 
INFLUENCE OF FIOBS ACTIVITIES ON BANK ROE 
E 
Independent Variable (Pool) (GLS Fixed) (GLS Random) 
Constant 0.274729 0.4951 0.5752 
(5.98568) (39.6057) (12.4734) 
Margin 1.36483 0.7266 0.83696 
(2 .8272) (6.4532) (2.1596) 
Expn -4.39526 -5 .5673 -7.1520 
(-6 .11878) (-27.2066) (-10.1367) 
Derive -0.00037 -4.99E-10 2.17E-10 
(-1.0970) (0.4126) (0 .4063) 
Dep 0.07536 
(5 .31847) 
Prem -0.580255 
(-4.33751) 
D(1) -0.11056 
(-2.75634) 
D(2) -0.09629 
(-2 .6C020) 
D(3) -0.01043 
(-0.31411) 
D(4) -0 .00356 
(-0.00356) 
R2 0.13792 0.97244 0.62665 
F-Statistic 13.5809 4328.386 
N 774 465 465 
Durbin-Watson 2.4087 1.3223 2.561 
NOTE: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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panel" models but tests significant at the 1 percent level and has a negative sign 
in the "GLS" model. The inconsistency of these results indicates that the impact 
of financial derivatives upon the return on assets is uncertain. 
The dummy variables are statistically significant for 1990, 1991, and 
1992 and are inversely related to ROA. The dummy variable for 1993 is 
statistically insignificant while the constant term represents 1994 and is 
statistically significant and positively related. 
The explanatory power of the model ranges from .2551 to .998. This 
suggests that, depending on the regression model selected, 25.51 to 99.8 percent 
of the variation in ROA is explained by the state or independent variables. 
The range of the reported Durbin-Watson statistic (DW) is 1.4256 to 
2.1727. The "pool" and the "GLS random" results reported a DW of 1.714 and 
2.1727, respectively, suggesting that there is no positive or negative 
autocorrelation. The "GLS fixed" results indicate a DW of 1.4256, which is less 
than the DW lower bound critical value of 1.578, reflecting that positive serial 
correlation exists. 
Table 13 reports the regression results for ROE. The same econometric 
methodology was used to evaluate the impact of financial innovation on the 
profitability of U.S banks relative to shareholder's equity or capital. 
The variable MARGIN is shown to be significant statistically for all 
regression results at the 1 to 5 percent level. This suggests a strong relationship 
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between bank lending spreads and ROE. According to Berger (1995), one can 
sometimes expect the traditional statistical relationship between bank lending 
margins and earnings to weaken. Between 1990 and 1994, the dividend payout 
ratios of U.S. banks declined, suggesting that bank managers tend to retain 
increasing amounts of marginal changes in earnings rather than distribute 
them to shareholders, adjusting the true rate of change of ROE, as compared to 
ROA, and possibly accounting for the weaker statistical relationship . 
The variable EXPN is statistically significant at the 1 percent level for all 
three regression results. This confirms the results from table 12 that the cost 
of the underlying operating structure is inversely related to the selected 
profitability measures. This suggests that the more successful bank managers 
are concerned with reducing the unit cost of transactions to induce a positive 
marginal change in profitability. 
The DERIVE variable results are statistically insignificant for all 
regression models. The results indicate that there is no statistical relationship 
between ROE and the level of financial derivatives relative to shareholder 
equity or capital. This suggests that the increase or decrease of ROE is 
unrelated to changes in the usage of financial derivatives. Also, financial 
innovations, like swaps, futures , options, and securitization, are not used by 
bank managers to enhance profitability. 
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The variable DEP was reported as part of the "Pool" regression model and 
was statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The results suggest that as 
U.S. banks captured a larger share of its funding from third-party deposits, 
ROE would increase. This indicates an increasing dependency of U.S. banks on 
deposits, which is considered to be a cheaper but more volatile source of funding 
due to the interest rate elasticity of depositors. Also, the increased dependency 
on deposits creates an inevitable mismatch between assets and liabilities. The 
duration of the liability structure is shortened, as banks increase third-party 
deposits; unless banks match this process by shortening the duration of assets, 
they increase their interest rate exposure. 
The variable entitled PREM was also reported as part of the "pool" results 
and was statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The inverse relationship 
between ROE and PREM indicates that as the uninsured deposit or market 
premium decreases, a bank's ROE will increase. The finding that uninsured 
debt rates respond to bank risk is consistent with most, but not all, of the 
market discipline literature in banking (Gilbert 1990; Berger, King, and O'Brien 
1991). 
The coefficient of determination for the three regression results ranged 
from .1379 to .97244. This suggests that the explanatory power of the three 
models varies, though the independent variables may be similar or the same, 
according to the functional form of the regression model. 
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The DW for all three regression results ranges from 1.3223 to 2.561. The 
"pool" and "GIS random" regression results were 2.4087 and 2.561 , respectively, 
indicating that any evidence of serial correlation is uncertain and fails to reject 
the null hypothesis. The "GIS fixed" results of 1.3223 fall below the DW critical 
value of 1.579, indicating the existence of positive serial correlation at the 5 
percent of confidence. 
D. Impact of Financial Innovation on 
the Variability of Bank Profitability 
A second component of our analysis is to consider not only how the level 
of financial innovation may influence the level of bank profitability but also its 
risk. Financial institutions are as concerned with the volatility, as well as the 
level of their earnings. Equation (17) depicts, in general form , the relationship 
between the variability in U.S. banks earnings (Varn), the level of operating 
risk (Orisk, Nontrad, Liquid, Lossrat) , and financial innovation (Swa, Futopt, 
Secrat) . If financial innovation has an important risk management role, then 
as earnings variability declines, financial innovation should proliferate among 
banks. 
VARn, = f(Orisk , Nontrad , Liquid , Lossrat , Futopt , Secrat) (19) 
where the signs of the key operating measures are 
avarn > 0 a varn > 0 avarn > 0 a varn > 0 
aOrisk ' aNontrad ' aLiquid ' aLossrat ' 
and the following relationships hold for the financial innovation variables: 
87 
2 Varn < 0 a Varn < O Varn < 0 
aSwa ' aFutopt ' aSecrat . 
It has been asserted that financial innovations, like derivative 
instruments, are utilized by depository institutions to hedge their exposure to 
interest rate risk to extend the depth of their product offering. Deshmukh, 
Greenbaum, and Kanatas (1983) argue that in the absence of appropriate 
derivative hedges, interest rate uncertainty will increase as the volatility of 
interest rates increases, causing banks to reduce their lending activities. 
The specification of the basic model follows the work by Brewer, Jackson , 
and Moser (1996). The model attempts to capture both operating and financial 
risks as they relate to the variance of the profitability measures. 
The DERIVA variables are the same series used in section B. According 
to findings by Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (1996), the usage of derivative 
instruments by U.S. S&Ls was inversely related to the variability of ROE and 
ROA. 
The results of the regression equation are outlined in tables 14 and 15. 
The results suggests that ORISK is statistically insignificant. This indicates 
that the increased variance of operating exposure (launching new products, 
excessive personnel, too many branches, poor technology, etc.) is not statistically 
correlated with variance of V ARROA. 
The NONTRAD variable was statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level for the "GLS fixed" and "GLS random" results, suggesting that as 
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TABLE 14 
INFLUENCE OF FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS ON THE V ARIABfLJTY OF 
BANK ROA 
Independent Variables VARRQA 
Pool (GLS Fixed) (GLS Random) 
Constant -3 .62E-05 -4.00E-05 -0.000142 
(-0.8011) (-4.6014) (-3.9014) 
Orisk 4.79E-11 1.52E-07 3.12E-07 
(1.0141) (0.7844) (0.43367) 
Nontrad 1.04E-06 0.00468 0.009755 
(0.33424) (10.0969) (5.1234) 
Lossrat 0.03033 -0.006783 0.01436 
(15.5922) (9.11282) (10.3075) 
Deriva -2.85E-13 -3.12E-13 
(-2.20746) (0.46513) 
Swa -6 .75E-05 
(-1.9295) 
Futopt 2.81E-05 
(.8570) 
Seer at -0.0024 
(-1.50 10) 
D(l) 8.74E-05 
(1.5656) 
D(2) -6.23E-05 
(-1.0970) 
D(3) -0 .000156 
(-2. 77949) 
D(4) -6 .05E-05 
(-1.08701) 
Rz 
.2725 .49119 .64923 
F -Statistic 28.5938 88.575 
N 774 465 465 
Durbin-Watson 2.2639 1.3863 2.5517 
NOTE: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
TABLE 15 
IMPACT OF FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS UPON THE V ARlAB!LlTY OF 
B ANK ROE 
VARRQE 
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Independent Variable Pool (GLS Fixed) (GLS Random) 
Constant 0.01550 -0.02789 -0.287602 
(0.24690) (-7.2725) (-6 .06732) 
Orisk -1.19E-07 -2.23E--05 -0.000113 
(-1.7987) (-0.5547) (-0.12920 1) 
Nontrad -0.02193 2.8276 13.1004 
(-4.9919) (7 .806) (6.12622) 
Lossrat 21.78797 19.7577 
(8.0060) (12.13822) 
Liquid 0.03633 
(2.8202) 
Swe -0.00477 
(-1. 7696) 
Futopte -0.06764 -0.000522 -1.74E- 10 
(-1.5181) (-1.8025) (-0.22187) 
Sece -0.13246 -3068.566 -66 102.2 1 
(-1.0 1941) (-0.10726) (-0.07685) 
D(1) 0.12229 
(1.5659) 
D(2) -0.05907 
(-0.74532) 
D(3) -0.10799 
(-1.37356) 
D(4) -0.06288 
(-0.80706) 
R2 .1251 .9247 .58415 
F -statistic 10.916 874.716 
N 774 450 465 
Durbin-Watson 2.7221 1.486 2.854 
NOTE: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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nontraditional assets increase, the variability of bank earnings will increase. 
This suggests that while banks are attracted by wider spreads on nontraditional 
loan assets, there is an increase in the bank's underlying risk. 
The DERIVA variable tested significant at the 1 percent level as well, 
indicating that as the usage of financial derivatives (interest rate swaps, 
interest futures and options, and securitization) decreases, the variability of 
bank ROA will increase and vice versa. This suggests that banks utilize 
derivatives to mitigate risk. 
The results for the variable LOSSRAT tested significant at the 1 percent 
level, suggesting increased loan losses impose greater levels of risk for banks. 
The results of the financial innovation variables all reflected the 
appropriate signs on the coefficients but tested differently statistically. The 
SWA and SECRAT variables were statistically significant at the 10 and 20 
percent levels, while FUTOPT tested statistically insignificant. The inverse 
economic relationship between all the financial innovation variables suggests 
that derivative instruments do play an important role in the risk management 
strategy of U.S. banks. 
The dummy variables all tested statistically insignificant except for 1992, 
D(3) , suggesting that forces other than time influenced the evolution of ROE. 
The explanatory power of the two models ranged from .2859 to .6492. The 
reported DW results range from 1.3863 to 2.5517. The DW for the "pool" results 
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suggests that no autocorrelation exists. The DW for the "GLS random" 
regression model falls into the uncertain region, while the DW for the "GLS 
fixed" is less than the DW critical value 1.579, suggesting the presence of some 
positive serial correlation. 
The results in table 15 reflect the variability of ROE against a similar set 
of independent variables. However, the financial innovation variables 
(DERIVE, FUTOPTE, and SECE) were transformed to be related to shareholder 
equity instead of assets. 
The results are similar to those reported on table 14 with a weaker 
statistical relationship for some variables. The ORISK variable in the "GLS 
fixed" regression model tested significant at the 1 percent level and insignificant 
in the "pool" and "GLS random" models. This may suggest that the operating 
structure of banks is more closely linked to the underlying capital base than the 
asset base. 
The NONTRAD variable tested significant at the 1 percent level in all 
three regression models. However, the results reported in the "pool" results 
were incorrectly signed. This could indicate that the increases of nontraditional 
assets in a bank's portfolio increases the uncertainty of bank earnings relative 
to both the assets and the capital base. 
The LIQUID variable results were statistically significant at the 1 
percent level for the "GLS fixed" model. This result indicates that banks may 
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increase their holdings in liquid assets in the face of increased uncertainty in 
earnings. 
The financial innovation variables (SWE, FUTOPTE, and SECE) tested 
differently across the two models. The SWE variable was significant at the 10 
percent level of confidence. This concurs with the result for the SWA variable 
in table 14, where the increase in the level of interest rate swap usage suggests 
a decrease in the level of uncertainty for bank profitability. 
The FUTOPTE variable tested significant at the 10 and 20 percent levels, 
while the SECE variable tested insignificant statistically. This is consistent 
with the findings of Blanco and Fawson (forthcoming), which suggest that banks 
can improve their ROA by securitizing, because the absolute value of assets will 
fall and cause a corresponding increase in the value of ROA. However, a bank's 
ROE may vary little or remain unchanged, since the capital base is unaffected 
and the overall profitability from securitization only increases by the net service 
and origination fees , having a minimal overall impact. 
The explanatory power of the model ranged from .1251 and .9247. The 
high R2 for the "GLS fixed" regression suggests that when the error term 
accounts for both cross-sectional and time-series variation, the specified 
independent variables will explain a larger portion of the variation in the 
dependent variable. The implication for bank managers is that there are key 
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operating variables and financial innovations that directly influence the bank's 
risk level. 
The DW ranges from 1.486 to 2.854. The DW of 2. 7221 and 2.854 for the 
"pool" and "GLS fixed" falls in the region of uncertainty for testing for the 
presence of autocorrelation, while the 1.486 result for the "GLS fixed" indicates 
the presence of some positive serial correlation. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The growth of financial innovations has played an important role in 
managing the risk of U.S. banks and made financial markets more efficient. 
The utility of derivatives has increased over time as financial and nonfinancial 
institutions have attempted to incorporate derivatives as part of their risk-
management strategy. 
Some companies with risk-seeking preferences utilized derivatives to 
speculate on interest rates and incurred substantial losses following the Federal 
Reserve Bank's unexpected increase in the discount rate in February 1994. 
Table 16 summarizes the losses of some of the principal financial and 
nonfinancial institutions in the U.S. 
Though U.S. regulators imposed risk-based capital requirements, some 
of the better-known banks in the U.S. incurred substantial losses that increased 
the value of the FDIC subsidy to these banks, salvaging shareholder values and 
depositor funds at the expense of taxpayers. 
The microeconomic effects of financial innovation have been determined 
to be a function of the underlying utility of specific institutions. A model of 
derivative usage by U.S banks found that banking firms are on the whole risk-
averse, while banks that are risk-seekers do so at the peril of shareholders by 
trying to maximize the value of the FDIC subsidy. 
TABLE 16 
SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL DERfVATfVE L OSSES BY THE PRINCIPAL 
FINANCIAL AND N ONFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
(ALL FIGURES IN $U.S. MILLIONS) 
Entity Name 
Orange County government 
Barings Brothers PLC 
Student Loan Marketing Co. 
Bank One of Columbus 
Federal Home Loan Bank of New York 
Eastman Kodak 
Household International 
PNC Bank 
Proctor & Gamble 
Gibson Greetings Card Co. 
Total 
Source: Hays 1996. 
Entity Type 
Financial Nonfinancial 
1,000 
639 
446 
242 
203 
1,700 
220 
207 
157 
___20. 
2,312 2,304 
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The postwar history, particularly since 1960, of financial innovation 
demonstrates that many of the major OECD countries show a shift of household 
assets towards financial instruments that hedge current (inflation, volatility of 
interest rates, etc.) and future (retirement, sickness, etc.) risks. The growth in 
new financial products provided new channels for savings that were historically 
not component parts of the monetary aggregates. The movement of significant 
funds into new asset classes caused the reliability of monetary aggregates, as 
a tool to forecast money growth, to diminish over time. 
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The evolution of the ratio ofM2 and M1 has been determined to be a good 
predictor of the adoption of financial innovation economywide. The evolution 
of the M2/M1 ratio can play an important role in determining money demand 
and its fluctuations , and the importance of this role increases with the rate of 
inflation (Arrau and De Gregorio 1993; Arrau et al. 1995; Melnick 1995; Siklos 
1993). 
The evolution of this ratio is shown in figure 8 for the United States, the 
United Kingdom , and France. The slope of the trend line for each ratio 
illustrates the domestic rate of adoption of financial innovation for each country 
over time. The standard deviation of each country's ratio describes the potential 
shift of the domestic level of financial innovation for any given reason. The 
larger the standard deviation, the greater the level of uncertainty among 
domestic households and firms concerning future financial innovation. The 
individual country graphs are shown in appendix A These results are reported 
in table 17. 
The correlation matrix in table 18 indicates how related or "correlated" 
any two country ratio variables may be. The signs of all the values are positive, 
suggesting they all move in the same direction. For example, for every one unit 
increase in the American financial innovation ratio (USFD. the British financial 
innovation ratio (UKFD will increase by .636625 of one unit. This suggests that 
over 63 percent of the financial innovations in the U.S. also exist in Britain . 
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j- FRFI ------- UKFI ---- USFij 
FlG. B.-Evolution of the financial innovation ratio (1961-94). 
This contrasts the relationship between the French financial innovation ratio 
(FRFI) and USFI and UKFI, which ranges from .467434 to .533915, 
respectively. The weaker relationship could be indicative of a more heavily 
regulated financial system in France, where financial innovations are slow to 
evolve because of delays that regulators may impose. 
Country 
United States 
United Kingdom 
France 
TABLE17 
FINANCIAL RATTO RESULTS 
Slope 
.02299 
.007655 
.012993 
Measure 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.0210 
.50428 
.46717 
Source: International Financial Statistics 1964-1996. 
FRFI 
UKFI 
USFI 
TABLE 18 
FINANCIAL INNOVATI ON RATI O CORRELATTON MATRIX 
FRFI 
1.00000 
0.467434 
0.533915 
UKFI 
0.467434 
1.00000 
0.636625 
USFI 
0.533915 
0.636625 
1.00000 
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Mean 
3.0248 
2.429 
1.8832 
The period-to-period change in the financial innovation ratio depicts the 
speed as well as the rate of adoption of financial innovation. The standard 
deviation of each ratio explains the average increase or decrease in financial 
innovation from period to period that households and firms must expect. In 
other words, there may be bad or excessively risky innovation that not only 
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causes the adopters of the innovation to lose money but transmits a signal to 
others of the downside risk potential of the entire class of innovation . For 
example, Proctor & Gamble and Gibson Greeting Cards participated in a risky 
innovation, leveraged foreign exchange derivatives, which provides a 
counterparty substantial upside and downside risk. After recording substantial 
losses, the demand for foreign exchange derivatives declined significantly for all 
investors. 
Figure 9 illustrates the evolution of the first difference of the financial 
innovation ratio for all three countries. The large spikes are related to a 
domestic or international currency crisis or a change in the computation of the 
monetary aggregatesa 5 The figure shows that the change in the financial 
innovation ratio increased over time for all three countries. While the change 
in the United Kingdom's ratio (CHUKI) dampened in the 1990s, the change in 
the French ratio (CHFRFI) actually increased over the same period. 
The change in the U.S. ratio (CHUSFI) suggests a boom or bust cycle 
during the 1980s and 1990s. This idea has been advanced by Persons and 
Warther (1996), who state that the adoption process is a stochastic rather than 
a linear process. 
35 1n 1983, the United S tates changed its ca lculation ofM2 to include money ma rket 
fund s . In 1987 , t he United Kingdom and France cha nged the ca lculation of quasi- money, 
indirectly affecting domestic M2 in both countn es. 
100 
0.6 
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FIG. 9.-Quarterly change in the financial innovation ratio. 
The change in the financial innovation ratio provides policymakers a 
unique challenge. The fluctuating value of M2 may no longer be a policy tool to 
forecast money demand. Rather, there are other variables that central bankers 
must view as indicators of the state of the liquidity preference of economic 
agents. 
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The current monetary aggregates provide information about the state of 
mind of financial markets and the propensity of households to make reallocation 
decisions. This should assist central bankers in fulfilling their second major 
role of providing liquidity to the financial system by acting as the lender of last 
resort. 
The introduction of risk-based capital measures imposed a regulatory 
discipline upon bank managers. This bounds the usage of financial derivatives 
by U.S. banks to capital. However, a large portion of financial innovation is 
introduced by U.S. nonbank financial institutions (investment banks, insurance 
companies, fund managers, etc.), which escape traditional regulatory channels. 
The welfare gains to society of relatively unregulated financial markets 
have been significant over time. The rate of adoption and the propensity to 
innovate will be dependent upon the level of domestic regulatory vigilance. A 
higher level of regulatory supervision will translate into a lower rate of adoption 
and smaller period-to-period changes of financial innovation among households 
and firms. 
The growing influence of financial innovation upon the financial system 
and the macroeconomy forces regulators to consider alternatives to traditional 
financial regulation. The traditional regulatory mechanisms have tended to be 
more instrusive and have increased compliance costs substantially. In the 
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United States, for example, the FDIC Improvement Act included several 
micromanagement provisions that were costly to implement and monitor. 
An alternative solution is to consider mechanisms that prevent problems 
from spreading to other institutions. Specifically, measures such as collateral 
requirements or pricing interbank credit exposures will limit excessive 
risk-taking throughout the financial system. Also, imposing credit limitations 
by individual borrowers will limit the concentration of excessive risk. 
A second alternative solution is limiting or even eliminating the FDIC 
subsidy for banking institutions. This would reduce the moral hazard problem 
inherent in the government deposit insurance program. For banks that persist 
in undertaking very complex financial transactions, their access to deposit 
insurance would be limited, while banks that continue with traditional banking 
activities would have unimpeded access to government deposit insurance 
programs. 
These measures would, in good part, eliminate the rationale of the 
regulators towards some banks of being "too big to fail." Under the traditional 
regulatory system, regulators have been very reluctant to close big banks for 
fear of the ripple effects throughout the financial system. Limiting the 
interbank levels of risk and constraining the availability of the deposit 
insurance subsidy isolate any liquidity or capital problems to a single 
institution , preventing a systemwide panic. 
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Undoubtedly, financial innovation has changed the face of domestic and 
world finance, permanently prompting regulators to respond in new and 
creative ways to handle the changing nature of the banking system. 
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Appendix B 
Summary ofGLS Fixed Effects Results (dummy variable results by bank) . 
flankLR~l::[QSsioo Results lli2A .I1Q.E VARROA Y.AJill.QE 
Bank of Boston 0.03726 0.70 19 -0.000172 
-0.40945 
(8.4943) (7.3524) (-1.8233) (-3.52931) 
First Bank of Boston 0.04544 0. 71284 -2.22£-05 -0.39407 
(I 1.527) (8.351) (-0.20875) (-3.0 1822) 
Shawmut Bank 0.03407 0.6529 -0.000272 -0.49255 
(6. 1327) (5.408) (-2.06427) (3.3890) 
State Street Bank & Trust 0.03053 0.6015 -0.000 191 -0.65437 
(5.9957) (5.436) (· 1.57424) (-4 .38827) 
U.S. Trust Co mpany 0.03•199 0.6233 -0.000 199 -0.45523 
(8.4502) (6.929) (-2.05245) (-3.82567) 
Fleet Bank 0.03506 0.6374 -0.000216 -0.415 
(7.878 1) (6.5981) (-2.08546) (-3.24558) 
First Fidelity Bank 0.029565 0.6374 -0.00016 
-0. 12359 
(7.7669) (6.598) (-1.75276) (-0.80599) 
Mid Atlantic Bank 0.03367 0.6215 -0.000284 -0.49091 
(8.183 1) (7. 1713) (-2.90716) (-4 .070 19) 
First American Bank of NY 0.03134 0.5896 -0.000191 -0.435 18 
(5 .8583) (5.077) (-1.4858) (-2 .76869) 
Atlantic Bank of New York 0.03667 0.6820 -0.0001 1 -0.22564 
(7 .2256) (6.2 12) (-0.85777) (· 1.43989) 
Citibank 0.03654 0.6228 -9.16£-05 -0.22191 
(9.5488) (7.494) (-2.45697) (· 1.89608) 
Bankers Trust 0.03655 0.671 I -0.000207 -0.3422 
(8.5665) (5.906) (-1.57543) (-2. 12922) 
Bank Leumi-NY 0.03709 0.6592 -0.000 168 -0.2964 
(9 . 1~21) (7.466) (-1.79766) (-2 .58982) 
Bank of New York 0.03692 0.6701 -0.00021 -0.40569 
(8.86629) (7.416) (-2.0789) (-3.23 19) 
Chase Manhattan Bank 0.040916 0.7169 -0.000131 -0.27207 
(9.9618) (8.0363) (-1.36398) (-2 .31644) 
Chemical Bank 0.044389 0.7813 -6.55£-05 -0.28406 
(10.956) (8.884) (-0.68361) (-2.4 17 I) 
European American Bank 0.03640 0.6548 -0.000246 -0.40918 
(8.7229) (7.221) (-2.3609) (-3. 19601) 
Israel Discount Bank 0.03089 0.5607 -0 .00017 -0.30249 
(8.2028) (6.879) -1. 75065 (-2.53382) 
Manufacturers Hanover TC 0.044565 0. 7427 
-4 .81£-05 -0.33017 
(10.6302) (8. 154) (-0.53146) (-2.97302) 
Morgan Guaranty Bank 0.03575 0.6•122 -8.54£-05 -0.29306 
(9.0899) (7.434) (-0.93824) (-2 .55182) 
Nat West Bank of USA 0.28539 0.5889 0.00018 -0.28094 
(5.20733) (4 .959) (1.42573) (-1.81825) 
Repub lic Nat. Bank 0.04 11 01 0.768 -0.00025 -0.43749 
(8.8689) (7. 194) (-2.45346) (-2 .95899) 
Chase Lincoln First Bank 0.0445 I 0.8924 -0.00035 
-0.66233 
(5.840 I) (5 407) (-1.93 102) (-2.90527) 
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Summary (cont'd) 
Aank/Rei::r~~sion Results RQA lill.E VARROA YA.JillQ.E 
MBNA America Bank 0.03906 0.8924 -0.00011 5 
-0.37 121 
(8.25788) (5.407) (-1.94649) (-2 .69553) 
Co restates 0.0366 0.7339 -0.00041 
-0 .7 11 43 
(7 . 10952) (7. 166) (-2. 73357) (-3.85 15) 
Provident Nat. Bank 0.0399 0.67 10 
-0.00026 -0.532 13 
(9.87707) (7.658) (-2.09999) (-3.48676) 
Hamilton Bank 0.047136 0.7088 -0.00022 
-0.5534 1 
(11.247) (7.783) (-1.93342) (-3.79160) 
Meridan Bank 0.02313 0.4688 -1.14E-05 
-0.58554 
(4 . 1578) (3.877) (-0.08226) (-3.42988) 
Centra l TC 0.039978 0.7806 -0 000385 -0.79612 
(5.25454) (4 .739) (-2 .07207) (-3.597 14) 
Fifth Third Bank 0.026472 0.4774 -0.00013 -0.32 118 
(3.84765) (3. 187) (-0.76858) (-1.45385) 
Ameritrust 0.03032 0.5804 -0.0001 
-0.27244 
(7.2824) (6.419) (-1.01688) (-2.24228) 
Society Nat. Bank 0.03656 0.6004 -0.00030 
-0.592 19 
(7.674 11) (4 .1004) (-268509) (-2.6517) 
Bancohio 0.036617 0.6363 -0 00352 
-0.64768 
(8.68542) (6.4232) (3.40039) (-4 .54304) 
Bank One of Columbus 0.038965 0.56352 -0.00025 
-0.453807 
(9.25330) (3.8016) (-2.29834) (-2 .0669) 
Pittsbu rgh NaL. Bank 0.03331 0.6274 -0.00019 -0.344688 
(6.254 18) (5.4336) (-1.52204) (-2. 14661) 
Mellon Bank 0.032878 0.64 12 -0.00025 -0.42488 
(6.02 174) (5.4128) (-1.94494) (-2.67009) 
American Security Bank 0.025694 0.4725 -0.00026 -0.48802 
(5.02296) (4 .26853) (-1.95533) (-2.98269) 
Riggs National Bank 0.036513 0.6573 -0.00018 
-0.328 155 
(9.37352) (7.7813) (-1.82643) (-2.69788) 
Fi rst Nat. Ba nk of Maryland 0.038573 0.6384 -0.00036 -0.6342 1 
(9.58764) (7.3027) (-2.68327) (-3.8 1453) 
Signet Ba nk 0.05328 0.8 16 1 
-2 62E-05 -0.37545 
(7.25848) (8. 7854) (-0. 14478) (-3.0904) 
First Union Nat. Bank 0.04548 0.7649 -0.00052 -0.39649 
(10.45205) (8.0927) (-3.55839) (-3.3035) 
Wachovia Bank & Trust 0.04819 0.7738 -0000177 
-0.558 18 
(11.15328) (8.2037) (-1.52993) (-3.9 156) 
South Carolin a Nat. Bank 0.042815 0.7306 -0.00016 
-0.405 19 
(9.8989) (7. 7430) (1.65367) (-3.28509) 
Sov ran Bank 0.041209 0.7289 -0.000192 -0.36596 
(8.76 196) (7. 1215) (-1. 70889) (-2.65 13) 
Crestar Bank 0 051803 0.7905 -0.00029 ·0.89006 
(11.464 17) (7 .800 I) (-1.92648) (-4 .57623) 
South t ru st Bank of Alabama 0.037 11 3 0.6645 -0.00017 -0.38 108 
(8.42 16) (6.96105) (-1.47303) (-2 .6347) 
NCNB National Bank 0.023807 0.4307 -0.00096 
-1.4842 1 
(2.90962) (2.4262) (-4 .34959) (-8.2073) 
117 
Summary (cont'd) 
Dankl.RQi:[QS~iQn Results ROA llil.E VARROA VARROE 
Capital Bank 0.035868 0.6022 -0.00015 -0.33004 
(8. 1695) (6.327) (- 1.44 384) (-2 .54729) 
S un Bank 0.05064 0.9077 -0.00012 
-0 .34952 
(7 .06955) (5.8608) (-0.66872) (-1.5659) 
Southeast Bank 0.035868 0.72 17 -0.00026 -0.43872 
(8. 1695) (6.972) (-2 .33646) (-2.9086) 
Bank South 0.04043 0.6453 -8.45E-05 
-0.3361 3 
(8.93544) (6.5442) (-0.80626) (-2 .56377) 
First NB of Atlanta 0.032977 0.57889 -2 .76E-05 -0. 156 16 
(6.43314) (5.205) (-0.21149) (-0.96501) 
First American Bank of GA 0.03094 0.6 11 8 -0.00022 
-0.47355 
(4 .27006) (3.8938) (-1.20605) (-2 . 1028) 
Hibe rnia National Bank 0.04329 0.6266 4.76E-05 -0.32283 
(9.96065) (6.6503) (0.44938) (-247 1 II) 
Vihitn ey Bank 0.032953 0.2998 0.00027 -0.04738 
(8.203) (3.3604) (2.7506 1) (-0.36238) 
Deposit G uaranty Bank 0.036284 0.6176 -0.00015 -0.35054 
(8.36 150) (6.5685) (-1.48768) (-2.7 1891) 
First American Nat. Bank 0.032565 0.56346 -0.0001 -0.2 1768 
(6.6 1846) (5.3011) (-0.82257) (-1.3897) 
Third Nat. Bank of Nashville 0.02994 0.5066 -646E-05 -0. 15292 
(6.22345) (4 .8769) (-0.50932) (-0.98411) 
Lasa lle National Bank 0.026822 0.5473 -0.00027 -0.540 17 
(5.225) (3.7540) (-1.88815) (-2.35234) 
Continental Bank 0.04046 0.77829 -0.0004 -0.3879 
(5. 7476) (2.8 115) (-2.65009) (-2.0119) 
First Nat. Bank of Chicago 0.048823 0.8Jl5 0.000239 -0.07759 
(7 .12340) (5.4804) (1.35667) (-0.35773) 
Harris Trust & Bank 0.059678 1.03 147 0.00037 -0. 10772 
(12. 7780) (10. 16002) (349015) (-0.81485) 
Northern TC 0.04408 0.75069 -0.00012 
-0.33862 
(9.8092) (7.7044) (-l.l5448) (-2.48385) 
Merchants National Bank 0.052278 0.9370 1 -9.88E-05 -0.448073 
(9.45780) (7.8195) (-0.76061) (-2.81392) 
Commercial Bank of Detroit 0.047713 0.80758 -0.00022 -0.67707 
(8 .2099) (6.3983) (-1.70141) (-4 . 19293) 
NBD Bank 0.03608 0.60798 -0.00022 -0 .38432 
(6.55494) (5.3987) (-1.6869) (-2 .38311) 
O ld Kent Bank & TC 0.03389 0.5700 12 -0.00021 -0.34938 
(4 .8727) (3.795) (1.16779) (-1.55652) 
Citize ns Fide lity Bank & TC 0.033652 0.56906 -0.0031 -0.51603 
(4 .89833) (3.8366) (-1.75057) (-2 .2697) 
First Bank of Louisville 0.01496 0.386927 -0.00046 -0.09044 
(2 . 1122) (2 .5274) (-2.75056) (-04 1841) 
Liberty National Bank 0.04439 0.70326 0.00017 -0.11507 
(6.5864) (4 .83559) (0.9655) (-0.53 163) 
Mercantile Bank of St. Louis 0.03824 0.6 17333 -5.00E-05 -0.22491 
(5.6479) (4 .22479) (-0.28342) (- 1.03896) 
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Summary (cont'd) 
Bank/R~r::rQSSJQn Results 
.!.illA JlQE_ VARROA VARROE 
Boatman's 13ank of St. Louis 0.03069 0.5 102 -9.06E-05 -0.23686 
(6.393 1) (4 .9 198) (-0. 70527) (-15030) 
Pirst Te nn essee Bank 0.039 13 0.67710 -0.000 14 -0 .32317 
(7 .670 1) (6. 1376) (-l.l246) (-2.06 17) 
Union Pla nters 0.03315 0.56499 -9.64E-05 -0.206 11 
(6.7176) (5.2987) (-076738) (- 1 33852) 
Nonvest 13ank of Mn. 0.03948 0.667 17 -0.0001 -0.332 11 
(7.9765) (6.2316) (-0. 77457) (-2 .01509) 
Pirst Interstate Bank 0.030977 0.5284 -0.00025 -0.42733 
(6. 168 19) (4 .8692) (- 1.97147) (-2.69502) 
United Bank of Denver 0.03335 1 0.59769 -0.00037 -0.599 19 
(4 .866 16) (4 .0376) (- 194439) (-2.54878) 
Co m. Bank of Kansas City 0.035486 0.62784 -0 00034 -0.56443 
(5. 16388) (4 .2283) (-1.8081) (-2.40006) 
13ank of Oklahoma 0.014758 0.27 139 -9.33E-05 -0.32452 
(2.2321) (190459) (-0.42807) (-12 144) 
Pirst City Texas Bank 0.045952 0.665178 -0.00016 -0.2852) 
(6.54997) (4 .50056) (-0.86972) (- 12852) 
I mpcrial Bank 0.03603 0.65804 -0.00021 -0.38048 
(5. 19515) (4 .2977) (-1.13799) (- 1 6268) 
Secu ri ty Paci[ic Bank 0.03574 0.62829 -9.70E-05 -0.23428 
(5.2908) (3.4915) (-1.54251) (- 107021) 
Bank of America 0 029453 0.72984 -0.00021 -0.37307 
(4 .366 1) (4 .930 1) (-2.22466) (· 169882) 
Bank of California 0.04606 0.6945 -156E-05 -0.3 1675 
(6.7 178) (6.2402) (-0.08689) (- 14 359 1) 
Union Bank 0.03948 0.66074 -0.000276 -0.38687 
(7.97653) (4.4549) (- 184556) (-1.15674) 
Sumitomo Bank 0.02897 0.69655 -0.000205 -0.43298 
(5. 168 19) (4 .6926) (- 151282) (- 1.2378) 
Wells Fargo Bank 0.037655 0.69655 -0.00016 -042987 
(7 .3 166 1) (4 .6926) (-1.86972) (- 175649) 
Bank of Hawaii 0.045303 0.8236 17 -0.000 12 -045324 
(6.60 11) (5.43217) (-0.7 11 28) (- 10145) 
First Hawaiian Bank 0.03629 0.64065 -7.95E-05 -0.096 
(5.30004) (4 .3492) (-0.445 18) (-0.4758) 
Uni ted States Nat. Bank 0.043089 0.500 1 -0.00023 -0 .32 189 
(6.26668) (3.3156) (-2.0129) (-2 .3 145) 
Seattle First Nat. Bank 0.00483 0.102535 -0.000 18 -0.3425 1 
(0.7353) (0.68028) (-2.03 707) (-2. 1546) 
Pirs t Sec urity Bank of Utah 0.03206 0.58889 -0.0001 19 -0.34256 
(4 .60856) (3.9 146) (-1.6769) (· 1 54367) 
Zions First Bank 0.03726 0.05909 -0.000221 -0.34526 
(4 .2928) (2 623 19) (- 1.9907) (- 169005) 
